Air Force Institute of Technology

AFIT Scholar
Theses and Dissertations

Student Graduate Works

3-6-2007

Beyond Passswords: Usage and Policy Transformation
Alan S. Alsop

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd
Part of the Information Security Commons, and the Other Operations Research, Systems Engineering
and Industrial Engineering Commons

Recommended Citation
Alsop, Alan S., "Beyond Passswords: Usage and Policy Transformation" (2007). Theses and Dissertations.
3037.
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/3037

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more
information, please contact richard.mansfield@afit.edu.

BEYOND PASSWORDS: USAGE AND POLICY TRANSFORMATION

THESIS

Alan S. Alsop, Major, USAF
AFIT/GIR/ENV/07-M1

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official
policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the United
States Government.

AFIT/GIR/ENV/07-M1

BEYOND PASSWORDS: USAGE AND POLICY TRANSFORMATION

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty
Department of Systems and Engineering Management
Graduate School of Engineering and Management
Air Force Institute of Technology
Air University
Air Education and Training Command
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Science in Information Resource Management

Alan S. Alsop, BS
Major, USAF
March 2007

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

AFIT/GIR/ENV/07-M1
BEYOND PASSWORDS: USAGE AND POLICY TRANSFORMATION

Alan S. Alsop, BS
Major, USAF

Approved:

____________//signed//__________________
Dennis D. Strouble (Chairman)

__05 Mar 2007__
date

____________//signed//__________________
Alan R. Heminger (Member)

__06 Mar 2007__
date

____________//signed//__________________
Brian G. Hermann (Member)

__05 Mar 2007__
date

AFIT/GIR/ENV/07-M1
Abstract
The purpose of this research is to determine whether the transition to a two-factor
authentication system is more secure than a system that relied only on what users “know”
for authentication. While we found that factors that made passwords inherently
vulnerable did not transfer to the PIN portion of a two-factor authentication system, we
did find significant problems relating to usability, worker productivity, and the loss and
theft of smart cards. The new authentication method has disrupted our ability to stay
connected to ongoing mission issues, forced some installations to cut off remote access
for their users and in one instance, caused a reserve unit to regress 10 years in their
notification and recall procedures. The best-case scenario for lost productivity due to
users leaving their CAC at work, in their computer, is costing 261 work years per year
with an estimated cost of 10.4 million payroll dollars. Finally, the new authentication
method is causing an increase in the loss or theft of CACs, our primary security
mechanism for accessing DoD installations, at a rate of 28,222 a year. A single tool, such
as the CAC, for all systems and services, carries much power, are we prepared for the
responsibility?
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BEYOND PASSWORDS: USAGE AND POLICY TRANSFORMATION

I. Introduction

Background
Currently, the primary method for network authentication on the Air Force’s
unclassified network has revolved around an authentication method known as “What I
Know.” (Singh 1985) That is, in order to access our networks, any individual only has to
know two things, the username (i.e. logon ID) and password. Research has shown that
relying strictly on a password based authentication method has inherent flaws and
vulnerabilities that are related to the human factors associated with retaining and recalling
multiple passwords (Martinson 2005). As such, user authentication is a significant source
of vulnerabilities for Air Force computer networks and systems (Martinson 2005). The
vulnerabilities became very apparent in August of 2005 when the Air Force announced
that 33,319 Air Force Personnel files, containing sensitive Privacy Act information, were
compromised by the unauthorized use of the username and password of a valid user. As
such, recent efforts have been focused on ways to bolster security through stronger user
authentication processes and methods (Hafemeister 6 Mar 2006). These efforts often
require the introduction of unique systems and processes that can change the way that we
use the systems and the policies that govern them. As of March of 2006, the Air Force
began to move away from a network authentication model that relies on just a username
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and password to a network authentication method that requires the use of a token (i.e.
Smart card) and a personal identification number (PIN).
With the transformation of user authentication, the question is whether the human
factors that create vulnerabilities in the “What I Know” verification method transfer to
the two-factor “What I Know” and “What I Have” user authentication method.
Additionally, will new vulnerabilities and risks be created by the new system? With the
new system, one PIN will be associated with the user’s smart card. We know that users
have PIN numbers for multiple systems. If the Air Force allows the member to create
their own PIN, would it be likely that they would choose a PIN number that they are
comfortable with? If the Air Force issues them a PIN, what is the likelihood that they
will write it down? Additionally, there will be problems associated with having a token
in order get network access. If the user is mobile, how will he get network access as not
all computers have smart card readers attached? Additionally, what if the user’s smart
card is lost, how long before the user is able to access the network again? During the
week, this would be quickly handled, but what about over the weekend, or on temporary
duty (TDY) at another location?
Problem Statement
With the move towards a new user authentication technique, will the Air Force
increase its ability to determine whether or not the user logged on is valid or not. Adding
additional security mechanisms appears to help, but the real answer lies in a thorough
analysis the usage and policies that come with the new authentication technique.
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Research Questions
With the transformation of user authentication in order to decrease the password
burden on the user while enhancing security, will users adhere to the new policies
concerning smart cards and PIN numbers and will these new security measures ensure
that Air Force networks as such are safer because of them?
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this research is to determine whether the new user authentication
methods will have an impact on the security of our networks. Specifically, the human
factors issues concerning password retention and policy guidance identified by Martinson
will be studied to determine whether they apply to the new authentication technique.
Next, the introduction of smart cards’ to the authentication process will be looked at to
determine if new vulnerabilities will be introduced because of this transformation.
Methodology
To collect data, an instrument was developed to question individuals that use the
new authentication technique. They answered a series of survey questions related to PIN
memorization and smart card usage. These survey questions were very similar to the
questions developed by Martinson for his research, but were adapted to the new
authentication measures. Additionally, several new questions were added specifically
relating to the user’s active control of smart cards. Before administration, the new
instrument was pilot tested first on the Information Resource Management (IRM) faculty
members and current IRM students in order to ensure reliability and content validity.
After the data was collected, it was summarized in the form or histograms and frequency
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of responses and then compared to data collected by Martinson using statistical analysis
tests to determine significance of any changes.
Assumptions/Limitations
The sample for this research was restricted to personnel working for the U.S. Air
Force (active duty and civilian). The data collected was restricted to only those sampled
personnel who are actively using the new authentication method as required for them to
access resources for work. Because this research utilized a survey method, there were
certain threats to the internal validity that needed to be negated. Since the survey asked
direct questions about their adherence to policy and procedures, the respondent might
answer in the expected way according to current policy out of fear of reprisal. While this
was a concern, the results from Martinson’s research showed that 71 percent of the
sampled population of military members admitted during the survey that they had written
passwords down, a clear violation of organizational policy. With that in mind and due to
the anonymous nature the survey, the reassurance that none of the data will be tractable to
the individual, the integrity of the individual military members, and the fact that the
sampling population is similar to Martinson’s population base, the error will be
negligible.
Research Hypotheses
1) The implementation of a two-factor authentication technique will increase
the effectiveness of network authentication as related to human factors.
2) The vulnerabilities that affect a strictly password based authentication
method will not have an effect on the PIN portion of a two-factor
authentication method?
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3) Individuals will be more likely to adhere to policy guidance under the new
authentication method as compared to password authentication.
4) The new authentication technique will contribute to a loss in worker
productivity and smart cards.
5) Accessibility of the networks will decline as individuals find it more
difficult to perform job tasks away from the primary workplace (i.e. TDY,
Leave) due to the requirement of having a token to authenticate.
Scope
The focus of this research looked specifically at usage and policy issues affecting
the new network authentication methods being implemented by the United States Air
Force (USAF). Additionally, it looked at how policy and other guidance are adhered to
and whether or not PINs would make a difference in regards to adherence. Additionally,
it looked at whether or not the use of smart cards affects accessibility. The results were
then compared with previous research.
Significance
Network security is a growing concern. With recent compromises of data, the
USAF is now implementing new network authentication methods in an effort to negate
some of the vulnerabilities associated with the old system. My research looked to see
what vulnerabilities will apply to the new authentication method and if any additional
weaknesses are introduced. This information can be used as a tool for the USAF in order
to assess the level of increased security and guide them to develop policies that will limit
the propagation of new vulnerabilities. This research can also be used to determine
whether more secure authentication methods are required.
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Thesis Overview
This chapter served as an introduction and review of the subject matter to include
current issues and previous research associated with password based authentication. It
also covers the purpose of this research and gives an overview of the method on which
this study was undertaken. Chapter Two contains a review of the of the literature
pertaining to the username and password authentication technique in addition to PINs,
smart card usage, and the human factors that affect both of those. Chapter 3 contains the
research method used. Chapter 4 contains an analysis of the raw data that resulted from
the instrument and an in-depth analysis of the data and its significance. Chapter 5 will
discuss conclusions, recommendations, and additional findings during the study and
provide suggestions for further research.
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II. Background
This chapter reviews username and password based authentication to include the
definitions of a strong password, password policies, vulnerabilities, strategies in
developing strong passwords, and the inherent human factors that attribute to their
weakness. Additionally, this chapter will review the emergence of smart cards to
authenticate to include their history, technology, security, and the Department of
Defense’s (DoD) implementation.
History of Password Problems
Before discussing the benefits or changes that a smart card logon technique will
provide, it helps to understand the vulnerabilities and problems that plagued the previous
authentication technique. For many years, passwords have provided the first line of
defense against intruders into computers and their networks (Gehringer 2002; NIPC
2002; Wakefield 2004; Martinson 2005). As such, organizations have required users to
have a username and password to authenticate to the information system and they have
employed system administrators to oversee the users (Gehringer 2002). In the 1980’s,
normal password creation policies consisted of telling users to use polysyllabic dictionary
words (Martinson 2005). By the 1990’s, computers were getting more powerful and
dictionary-based attacks were beginning to appear. As such, the typical guidance for a
good, or strong, password transformed to the point that they needed to contain upper and
lower case letters, numbers, punctuation characters, be seven or eight characters in
length, and be easy to remember (Gehringer 2002). At the time, access to organizational
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networks was still somewhat more restricted and difficult to access, and brute force
attacks on username and password systems were less common (Gehringer 2002).
With the exponential increase in the speed of personal computers, following
Moore’s Law, and the growth of the Internet, the definition of what makes a strong
password had to evolve even further. Unfortunately, even in light of the increasing
capabilities of our computing resources, the users’ perception of what constitutes a secure
password do not always keep pace with the advances in technology. Additionally,
guidance to users on how to create strong passwords and enforcing those policies has
been hit or miss at best. It is the responsibility of the organizations system administrators
to keep the network secure and part of this is ensuring that users understand the latest
techniques of developing strong passwords. Current guidance defines a strong password
as one that is at least eight characters in length, contains a mix of upper- and lower-case
letters, numbers, and symbols. Additionally, it cannot contain a name or dictionary
word, be a variation of a previous password, or use symbols that are similar to the
characters they are replacing (e.g. 3 instead of E)(Jianxin Yan 2000; Wakefield 2004;
Martinson 2005; Microsoft 2006). What we are seeing here is a trend in strong password
definitions trying to stay ahead of the technology, systems, and techniques that are used
compromise them.
A username and password scheme based on letters and numbers, which comprise
of 62 character variations, can be compromised using brute-force password attack scheme
in a minimal amount of time by using resources that are available today (see figure 1). In
this case, the number of combinations for an 8-character length password is 218 Trillion.
With a powerful enough computer, a brute force attack can crack the password in a little
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over 60 hours.

Figure 1 - 62-Character Based Password Recovery Times (LockDown 2006)

Attempts to overcome these types of vulnerabilities entailed changing the
definition for a strong password and the policies for creating them to a 96-character based
password (Figure 2) schema. This includes adding special characters to the 8-character
password requirement. This increased the number of available permutations from 218
Trillion to 7.2 Quadrillion, which is approximately 33-times the number of combinations
that a brute-force attack would have to compute in order to compromise the password of
a 62-character based schema. While it would take a very powerful single computer
almost three months to complete this task, a network of computers, which could include
several hundred machines, could crank through all the combinations significantly faster.

Figure 2 - 96-Character Based Password Recovery Times (LockDown 2006)
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In order to ensure that users develop passwords that are less susceptible to
compromise, system administrators utilize password development policies, some of
which are automated to ensure they are enforced. One of the key techniques to ensure
that users are following strong password creation policies is making certain that users are
trained so that they understand the vulnerabilities and risks to the system (Wakefield
2004). Additionally, organizations need to provide feedback to the users so that they
understand what information is sensitive and considered an asset to the organization. If
the organization does not do this, then users tend to develop their own understanding of
what is actually sensitive information, which may or may not be correct (Anne Adams
1999). This kind of behavior can lead to the user’s belief that certain information is not
at risk, and as such, contribute to the their indifferent attitude towards security.
Additionally, users need to know how to develop strong passwords and
understand why they need to create them. Inadequate knowledge of password
procedures, content, and cracking lies at the root of user’s “insecure” behaviors (Anne
Adams 1999). According to Martinson, 36 percent of users either did not know or felt
there were no negative consequences to not changing a password on a regular basis. This
means that implementing effective password policies must entail ensuring that users
understand why these policies are in effect in the first place. Thus, in order to maintain
the security of username and password based authentication systems, there is a critical
balancing act between users and system administrators between having enough rules for
good security, but not so much as to be viewed as an unnecessary burden by the users
(Gehringer 2002; Martinson 2005). One of the most common password policies is the
forced password change mechanism by which a user must change their password every
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60 or 90 days. The problem here is when users must change their passwords frequently
they tend to come up with techniques or patterns that assist them in recalling the
password but are inherently less secure. Forcing restrictions on users without letting
them know why they are necessary will eventually lower the user’s regard for overall
security (Anne Adams 1999). In one study, it was found that when users were forced to
change their passwords frequently and were prevented from using previous passwords,
the users would cycle through a multitude of passwords very quickly in order to exhaust
their password history list and get back to their favorite password (Jianxin Yan 2000).
While the purpose of this policy as implemented was intended to reduce the impact of a
potential undetected security breach, a consequence of it led to the reduction of the
overall security of the network due to the recycling of familiar passwords (Anne Adams
1999). Other strategies that have been used to ensure stronger password development
include training users to create passwords using pass-phrases (Gehringer 2002; Wakefield
2004) and to have users test their passwords against password strength testing tools
(Microsoft 2006).
The point here is that password policies and the reasons for them need to be
clearly communicated to the user in order to ensure compliance. If the user does not
understand why nor what they need to do to ensure that their username and password is
secure, their use and regard for security in general will wane and vulnerabilities to the
organizational networks will propagate.
Why do we need to have secure passwords? In addition to brute force attacks,
which test every possible password combination, username and password based
authentication techniques are also susceptible to other vulnerabilities. Every year,
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thousands of computers are illegally accessed because of weak passwords. Common
weak password choices include: using a dictionary word, dictionary words followed by
two numbers, using names of people, places, or things, and using the default passwords
on systems. Unfortunately, hackers are aware of these types of vulnerabilities and target
them first (NIPC 2002). Some common password attack schemes used by hackers that
target weak passwords include educated guessing (e.g. dictionary attacks) of passwords
and deriving passwords (e.g. common names) (Neumann 1994). As far back as 1990,
hackers were creating dictionaries of 60,000 or more words for the express purpose of
attacking username and password based authentication systems. By 2000, these
dictionary based cracking systems were also testing permutations of words to include
substituting special characters and capitalizing non-initial characters (Gehringer 2002).
Another vulnerability to password authentication that is common today is their
susceptibility to spyware attacks. Common advice to users is to refrain from typing
passwords on computers that they do not control or are in insecure environments. This
includes those computers that are located at internet cafes, computer labs, and airport
lounges. These systems are unsafe as criminals can try to get users password information
by using inexpensive keystroke-logging devices that take only a few moments to install.
In addition, users are advised not to install software on their home systems unless they
are confident of the source of the file as the file could be a Trojan (i.e. appears to do one
thing while in reality it is capturing users keystrokes). These spyware programs can
allow someone to remotely access all information that is typed on the compromised
system (Microsoft 2006). To compound this, hackers know that a password for one
system is likely to access many other accounts by that same user. This can be especially
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dangerous on systems where the user has resorted to using a password management
system, or “wallet”, such as “Microsoft Passport” or “Darn! Passwords!” These
programs are inherently vulnerable to attacks by spyware and viruses and anyone with
access to the computer would have access to all the passwords in the wallet (Gehringer
2002). Once a hacker has one password, the security of the rest of their accounts thus
becomes compromised (NIPC 2002).
The greatest vulnerability of username and password based authentication
schemes lies ultimately in the user. Human error is the principal cause of security
breaches in the computing security sector of organizations. They accounted for 84% of
the security breaches in 900 private and public American organizations in 2001
(CompTIA 2002; Christina Braz 2006). Martinson’s survey of password usage found
that: 96% of users recycle or use similar passwords for multiple applications, 71% of
users write their passwords down, 39% of users have shared their passwords, 29% of
users use familiar names, places, or dates for their passwords, and 68% of users have
changed a password so that it is easier to remember. Additionally, regardless of the
guidance given to users via training and corporate policies, a small percent of users will
ignore sound password advice for convenience (Jianxin Yan 2000). Part of this lies in the
fact that users do not understand why they need to follow security policies and some lies
in the fact that users don’t understand the threats to the systems and how exactly their
systems could be compromised. Users still tend to think that password cracking is done
on a “personal” basis, and they perceive the risk to be low because their role in the
system is not important (Anne Adams 1999). Additionally, users do not understand how
password cracking programs work and thus do not understand what comprises a secure
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password (Anne Adams 1999). Another reason for these human vulnerabilities is that
humans by nature have limited capabilities (e.g. short-term capacity of around seven plus
or minus two items) for memorizing sequences of items (e.g. passwords)(Jianxin Yan
2000). Additionally, when humans remember sequences of items, those items cannot be
drawn from arbitrary or unfamiliar ranges, but must be familiar ‘chunks’ such as words
or familiar symbols (Jianxin Yan 2000). With so many accounts, complex password
requirements, lockout policies, and short password lifetimes, system administrators are
ensuring that users come up with techniques that will assist their ability to memorize the
password at the cost of compromising security (Gehringer 2002; Martinson 2005). One
of the most common examples of this is when users have multiple accounts with different
passwords, they will feel inclined to write their password down in order to prevent
getting locked out (Gehringer 2002; NIPC 2002; Wakefield 2004)
Another weakness of username and password based authentication schemes is our
susceptibility to social engineering techniques designed to gather the password
authentication information. Hackers pay more attention to the human link in the security
chain than security designers do. This is demonstrated by the social engineering
techniques used to obtain passwords (Anne Adams 1999). Common social engineering
methods include: sending a Trojan program as an email attachment, posing as a new
employee needing help, offering a prize for registering at a Web site with a username and
password, and posing as a vendor or systems manufacturer calling to offer a system patch
or update (Mitnick 2002).
Each of these attacks can be successful and are inherent of any authentication
scheme that relies solely on methods in which users must recall information as opposed
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to providing some form of physical proof that the network can validate. Our networks
are essential to the success of our war fighting missions and the protection of our privacy
information. Unauthorized access, fraud, tampering, eavesdropping and data theft all
pose a threat to these systems. One of the key weaknesses of our network is the use of
passwords that many of us have grown accustomed to using. As described previously,
conventional passwords are vulnerable to attack and allow adversaries to access our
systems at will and move about freely, posing as legitimate users from the safety of their
own base of operations (SPO 2006). In order reduce the impact of these human factors
based vulnerabilities and better secure the network, authentication systems need to ask
for more than just what a user knows before they allow them network access, which
brings us to the introduction of smart cards in the authentication process.
Smart Cards (a.k.a. CAC)
The DoD implementation of the smart card, known as the common access card
(CAC), is designed to provide for that increased security. The advantage of this type of
authentication system, commonly referred to as “two-factor authentication”, is that it
requires something you have, (e.g. CAC), and something you know, (e.g. PIN) (SPO
2006) as opposed to just something you know, which is the basis for the username and
password authentication system.
A smart card is a complex embedded system that takes advantage of state of the
art silicon technologies and microprocessors. In addition to processors, they normally
have several types of data storage to include non-volatile memories such as read only
memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read only memory (EEPROM),
Flash, and random access memory (RAM). They also include communications

15

interfaces, which can be contact-less (i.e. radio frequency identification (RFID)), analog
parts and sensors, which protect the chip against attacks, and embedded software that
includes secure operating systems, virtual machines, firewalls, cryptography and other
specific applications (Philippe Proust 2004). The term “smart card” has been associated
with any credit card-sized card with more memory than the traditional magnetic stripe.
For this research, the “true” smart card has the data storage and has an on-board
embedded processor or smart chip (Katherine Shelfer 2002). Anything less than that is
really just a storage card and provides no security features to protect its data from being
read out. A true smart card not only provides a way to store its data, but can also
function as a small computer with built-in security features to guard against unauthorized
access to its data and functions (Scheuermann 2002).
For the DoD, the CAC will be using integrated technologies to perform standard
identification, physical access, and logical access. Some of the initial applications
designated to be using the CAC are identification, network authentication, and physical
access. Other applications currently under development or evaluation include dining
services, finance, travel, medical and dental readiness, deployment readiness, equipment
accountability, and training (DoD 2003).
The idea of placing processors in plastic cards was the idea of German inventors,
Jergen Dethloff and Helmut Grotrupp, who patented the idea in 1968. In 1974, Roland
Moreno filed for a patent on the integrated circuit (IC) card, later dubbed the “smart
card.” Moreno received a first patent in France in 1975 and a U.S. Patent (number
4,092,524) in 1978 (Katherine Shelfer 2002). While the concept of the smart card was
established, it was not until 1977 that technology caught up to the idea and Motorola
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produced the first smart card circuit chip. The first commercial use of the smart card was
attempted in 1980 by the French banking association, Bancaires, when they used smart
card technology in an attempt to reduce fraud from criminals who were counterfeiting
credit cards by copying the magnetic stripes. Because of this initiative, credit card fraud
rates in France from those cards dropped tenfold. By 1992, the French financial
institutions decided to replace magnetic stripe cards with smart cards and as such,
benefited from a 75% reduction in credit card fraud over a five-year period (Katherine
Shelfer 2002). This shows that by adding another layer of security, more secure than just
a magnetic strip card, can lead to quantifiable benefits in regards to reducing
unauthorized use of the card. Since 1993, the Department of Defense (DoD) has been
conducting evaluations of smart card technology. Initially tested as an updateable data
storage device, it has evolved to require an interoperable, backward compatible device for
secure on-line data transfer and on-line transactions (DoD 2001; White-House 2004). In
September of 1999, the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF), Dr. John Hamre,
and the Defense Management Council (DMC) decided to adopt the smart card, or CAC,
as the new DoD identification card (DoD/ACO 2000). In November of 1999, the
DEPSECDEF published a memorandum titled, “Smart Card Adoption and
Implementation”. This directed the DoD to use smart card technology for identification,
physical access, an authentication token for the DoD PKI, and access to DoD computer
networks (DoD/ACO 2000). By the beginning of October 2000, the DoD began issuing
the new CAC (DoD 2001). Guidance for the use of the new smart card was then
incorporated into DoD Directive 8190.3, dated 31 Aug 2002:
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4.2 Smart card-based technology and systems shall be used to transform
and improve security in DoD processes and mission performance
thereby enhancing readiness while also improving business processes.
4.5 Smart card technology shall be applied in the form of a Departmentwide common access card (CAC) that shall be:
4.5.1 The standard identification card for active duty uniformed services
personnel (to include the selected reserve), DoD civilian employees,
eligible contractor personnel, and eligible foreign nationals
4.5.2 The department’s primary platform for the public key
infrastructure authentication token used to access DoD computer
networks and systems in the unclassified environment and, where
authorized by governing security directives, the classified
environment
4.5.3. The principal card enabling physical access to building facilities,
installations, and controlled spaces
In August of 2004, the White House published a Homeland Security Presidential
Directive, HSPD-12, which adopted the use of a CAC as identification for all federal
employees and the contractors that work for the federal government. This was in
response to a need to reduce risk of terrorism to Federal and other facilities due to wide
variations in quality and security of the forms of identification (White-House 2004). Key
features of this new identification card and a timeline for implementation were outlined
in sections 3 and 4 of the document:
Section (3) “Secure and reliable forms of identification” for purposes of
this directive means identification that (a) is issued based on sound
criteria for verify an individual employee’s identity: (b) is strongly
resistant to identity fraud, tampering, counterfeiting, and terrorist
exploitation; (c) can be rapidly authenticated electronically; and (d)
is issued only by providers whose reliability has been established
by an official accreditation process.
Section (4) Not later than 4 months following promulgation of the
standard…identification issued by departments and agencies to
Federal employees and contractors meets the standard. As
promptly as possible, but in no case later than 8 months after the
date of promulgation of the standard, the departments and agencies
shall require the use of identification by federal employees and
contractors that meets the standard in gaining physical access to
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federally controlled facilities and logical access to federally
controlled information systems (White-House 2004).
In response to HSPD-12, the National Institute of Standards and Technology
Computer Security Division initiated a new program for improving the identification and
authentication of Federal employees and contractors for access to Federal facilities and
information systems. Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 201, entitled
Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors, was
developed to satisfy the requirements of HSPD-12. It was approved by the Secretary of
Commerce and issued on February 25, 2005 (CSRC 2006).
The CAC has evolved from its original intent as an updatable data storage device
in 1993 to become an interoperable, backward compatible processing and data storage
device with secure logical authentication and physical access capabilities. Additionally,
it is now the standard identification and Geneva Convention Card for active duty and
Selected Reserve members of the Uniformed Service, DoD civilian employees, and
eligible contractor personnel. The mandatory compliance date for all agencies to produce
and provide CACs that are compliant with the first stage of PIV standards as set forth in
FIPS 201, is mid 2007 (DMDC 2005). One of the most visible aspects of these changes
is the institution of the secure logon requiring use of the CAC and a PIN. The Air
Force’s deadline for enforcing smart card logon (SCL) was 31 July 2006. As of 7 August
2006, only 53% of Air Force users were compliant (AFCA 2006).
To understand how a smart card is going to help us provide a more secure
computing environment, we need to understand the technology that underlies it. As I
noted above, smart cards have been used for many years in Europe. One of their key
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benefits is the familiar package that they come in. They are in essence credit-card-sized
computers with a rugged and familiar form that fits nicely into a wallet or pocket and can
take lots of physical stress (David Sims 1999).
A smart card typically consists of three components: a plastic card, a
microprocessor, and a communication interface. Generally, the plastic card contains one
or more embedded integrated circuit chips (ICC) (a.k.a. microprocessor) in addition to
other data, display, storage, or transfer technologies such as a photograph, hologram,
linear barcode, two-dimensional barcode, magnetic stripe, radio frequency antenna, and
biometrics. They normally support multiple applications, such as storing personal data,
calculating values, validating biometric identification, performing digital certification,
and encrypting information (DoD 2001).
The plastic card acts as a convenient package for the microprocessor and provides
a place to print text and graphics (see figure 3). The smart card chip is located near the
edge of the plastic card. This is done to protect the chip if the card is twisted or bent and
to accommodate backward compatibility for systems that used to require a magnetic
stripe (i.e. credit cards) or bar code on the backside of the card (see figure 4)(Katherine
Shelfer 2002). This versatility for multiple technologies allows a single card to meet
different needs and allows the smart card to be phased into existing systems (Nelson
1993). In the case of the USAF, the CAC will be used to replace the existing
identification card, giving the user additional capabilities and still providing the same
benefits and privileges as its predecessors (DoD 2001).
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Figure 3 - Smart Card Front (CSD 2005)
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Figure 4 - Smart Card Back (CSD 2005)

The microprocessor portion of a smart card is a programmable microcomputer
that incorporates a CPU, memory, communication port, and control logic on a single
chip. The ICC is a small piece of semi-conducting material on which the integrated
circuit is embedded. A typical chip can contain millions of electronic transistors
(DoD/ASD 2002). Usually such cards have an embedded 8-, 16-, or 32-bit processor.
Even the 8-bit microprocessor-based smart card is as powerful as the desktop PCs of the
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early 1980s (Katherine Shelfer 2002). This microprocessor is a really a computer that
has the capability to read, write, and perform various operations to its’ onboard memory
(DoD 2000). Additionally, included on most ICCs is an on-board cryptographic coprocessor that allows signing and key generation to be done entirely on the card. This
ensures that the private key data never needs to be offloaded or revealed (David Sims
1999). This cryptographic co-processor allows the smart card to serve as an
authentication device for the PKI identity, email, and encryption certificates (DoD 2003).
The microprocessor stores its’ programs and data in ROM, RAM, EPROM, and
EEPROM (Nelson 1993; Katherine Shelfer 2002). The RAM provides storage for
temporary data, the EPROM provides programmable, permanent information storage for
fixed information, and the EEPROM is nonvolatile read/write memory and is similar to a
computer disk drive. It is the storage location for data and application program files
(Nelson 1993). Currently, the data contained on a smart card can be stored reliably for a
maximum of 10 years (Katherine Shelfer 2002).
The smart card is not a self-contained computer; it requires power and timing
signals from an external source. Card-Acceptor devices (CADs) provide the physical
interface between the smart card and other devices. The CAD holds the smart card in
place and includes a set of contacts that correspond to the “communication interface” on
the smart card. The most widely used, and the ones that the US Air Force are currently
using, smart cards have metal surface pads and are called “contact smart cards.” Smart
cards with subsurface leads are called “contactless smart cards.” These cards receive
their power through inductive coils and exchange signals through capacitive plates
(Nelson 1993).
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What will these advances in technology provide in regards to increasing the level
of security during network authentication? A smart card has the following general
security functions: cryptographic applications, user authentication via PIN, and device
authentication (Scheuermann 2002). The capabilities of smart cards allow them to
authenticate themselves without having to interface with a centralized computer system
(Nelson 1993). This prevents secure data from the vulnerability of traveling over the
network.
Integrating smart cards, biometrics and public key cryptography provides a solid
foundation for developing secure applications and communication systems. The highest
level of security uses three-factor authentication: something you know (PIN), something
you have (smart card, magnetic stripe card or a physical key) and something you are
(biometric) (David Sims 1999). The next level of security incorporates two of those
factors. In the case of the CAC and PIN, a two-factor authentication system,
authorization is given based on something the user knows and something the user has.
As such, neither possession of the card alone nor knowledge of the password alone is
sufficient to allow an impostor to masquerade as the authorized user (Keok Auyong
1997). Smart cards provide an environment that enables secure processing that is
associated with network user authentication to occur only within the trusted device,
which is always under the physical control and protection of the user. This improves
system security in three ways: It requires a user to provide both something he or she
possesses (i.e. smart card) as well as something he or she knows (i.e. PIN). Either item
alone is useless. This greatly reduces the risk that was shown to exist on username and
password based authentication systems of password borrowing or theft. It also ensures
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that security related data is encrypted while on the user’s workstation. A malicious
Trojan program can obtain no sensitive information from it (Keok Auyong 1997).
Additionally, if the user loses the smart card, the card is inoperable without the
PIN. Guessing a smart cards PIN will be frustrated because the processor on the smart
card normally will have a routine that locks the card after three or four incorrect PIN
attempts (Chadwick 1999; DoD/ACO 2000; SPO 2006). Another factor that contributes
to the increased security of smart card is the decreased possibility of copying the smart
card’s private key because it never leaves the card. The smart card uses its
microprocessor to compute the transmitted data’s digital signature (Chadwick 1999).
Additionally, smart cards can contain on-board cryptographic co-processors that allow
signing and key generation to be done entirely on the card, so that the private key never
leaves the card and thus eliminates the possibility of the key pair being snooped out
during transmittal. The cryptographic co-processor performs tasks such as key
generation and verification, secure signing, hashing, and encryption (David Sims 1999).
Thus, to access data on the chip, or utilize the certificates on the chip, a PIN must be
entered (DoD/ACO 2000).
In order to ensure the security of DoD computer systems, access to them will be
granted only when all of the following are present: the CAC, PIN, valid certificate, and
authorization to that particular computer or system. Any application that wants to read
and write data to and from the card must be registered and digitally signed by the U.S.
Government. If the keys for this process are not present, the smart card processor will
not allow the data to be accessed (DoD/ACO 2000). Additionally, in order to prevent the
CAC from being counterfeited for physical access based on just identification, the DoD
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CAC contains visual anti-counterfeiting components to include the use of holograms and
ghost images. The card and its chip are also made more tamper-resistant by the use of
dual-sided lamination, which prevents the modification of the printed information or
images (DMDC 2005). The goal of these security measures is to negate the use of stolen
or borrowed cards to gain access and provide appropriate security to the entire identity
proofing and authentication process (CSD 2005).
Table 1 - Overview of Smart Card Security Features (Nelson 1993)

Logical Security Features
Data is not written or read directly by a reader; rather it is written or retrieved using command
requests from a host system, with the smart card’s microprocessor controlling access to the data
Data access authorizations (e.g., read and write) are protected with password data access control
The Operating system protects internal security information in hidden data areas
The PINs and keys never leave the card, so that they cannot be captured and analyzed
Cards “lock up” after successive invalid PIN entries
Authority access matrices determine whether an instruction executed in one memory area can
access data stored in another area

Physical Security Features
Memory, CPU, and logic are integrated onto a single IC with no external bus that can be
monitored
Tamper detection devices disable the microprocessor when card tampering is detected
Tamper protection by card layering, microprocessor embedding, protective coatings, and epoxy
technologies prevent compromise through layer and IC removal
Leads used for IC testing are fuse connected, then blown before the cards are issued
The smart cards and ICs are manufactured in secure facilities where the chip wafers are
accounted for, tested, and assigned a unique serial number

The overarching goal of implementing the smart card for network authentication
is to increase the security of critical communications resources. Based on the research,
this would appear to be the case. The question that I’ll be answering is whether or not the
human factors associated with usage and policy are going to have a positive or negative
affect on our security posture as we transition to this new technology.
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III. Methodology
Procedures
Data was collected via a 40-item survey accessed by U.S. Air Force military and
civilian respondents. The surveys were distributed to the organizational members through
a web-based interface. To encourage participation in addition to ensuring the anonymity
of participants, each survey included a forward that informed them that only personnel
directly involved in the research would have access to the raw data. Additionally, the
personal data collected by the survey was limited to age, gender, occupation (officer,
enlisted, civilian, contractor), and whether or not they have worked in the computer
security field. The data collected from the surveys were stored in a database at the Air
Force Institute of Technology. The survey period lasted from 14 December 2006 to 11
January 2007.
Participants
The expectations of survey participants were explained on the first page of the
survey. Furthermore, the survey summarized the fundamental purpose for the data
collection and encouraged everyone’s participation in the study. Participants were also
instructed to direct any questions to the researchers using provided contact information.
The survey was sent via email to a representative sampling of members of a
United States Air Force (USAF), a population of approximately 491,786 (AFPC 2006)
military and civilian members, located throughout the world with an initial representative
sample of 4,831 members. The survey only targeted military and civilian members of the
USAF, but 18 contractors did respond. This is probably due to outdated information on
the Air Force Global Email Address directory. Of those, 301 of the surveys did not make
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it to their recipients due to errors such as delivery refused, out of office responses, remote
host not found, mailbox no longer exists, and mailbox full. With the delivery failures
factored in, the number of surveys sent out is reduced to 4,530. 749 recipients took the
survey and 725 of those provided usable data, resulting in a 16 percent response rate and
a sample size of n = 725. Due to a technical error with the data collection tool, 412 of the
725 completed surveys were missing responses for questions 2 through 6, although all the
other data for those surveys were collected. Results for questions 2 through 6 will be
analyzed using a sample size of n = 313.
Design
The survey design was longitudinal between-cases panel design. In this study, the
cases are defined by the independent variable of whether the participant is using a
username and password authentication technique or a CAC and PIN based authentication
technique. The dependent values were measured only once, Martinson has already
collected the data for the case of username and password authentication and this research
collected the data for the case of CAC and PIN based authentication.
Surveys are more susceptible to certain internal validity threats such as demands
on participants, researcher effects, history and maturation, systematic trends, causal
direction, predispositions, and similarity in measurement. As such, these issues must be
addressed in order to limit their impact and effect on the results (Schwab 2005). Demand
effect was controlled by having an independent variable that was not measured during the
survey, thus participants did not respond based on expected relationships between the
independent variable and the dependent variable. Researcher expectation effects will be
limited due to the anonymous nature of the survey, as discussed previously, and the lack
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of any interaction between researcher and participants. History, maturation, and
systematic trends may pose a concern as security issues, such as the theft of Air Force
personal information mentioned previously, may have increased participant awareness of
security policies and practices. Causal direction will not be a concern as the usage
characteristics, or dependent variables, do not determine the authentication technique. In
this survey, temporal precedence is conceptually clear in regards to authentication
method determining usage characteristics as opposed to vice versa. Participant
predispositions should not be a concern, as the sampled populations are similar, both
being military related, and the sample sizes, Martinson has 338 responses and I had 725
(n = 313 for questions 2-6) responses, are significant enough for a normal population
distribution. Additionally, the survey was tested for face validity, content validity, and
reliability to ensure that the measures were construct valid. Face validity was determined
through surveys given to representative sample, pilot group, of participants and the
construct was judged content valid by the research team. Additionally, since the causal
relationship is clear, internal validity is not a serious concern (Schwab 2005).
Measures
The survey was designed to measure three dimensions of CAC usage in addition
to participant individual characteristics. The three dimensions included CAC and PIN
usage, CAC control, and CAC and PIN guidance. The participant characteristics of
interest included age, gender, occupation, and involvement in the computer and network
security field. The survey used is attached as Appendix B. The questions can be crossreferenced with Martinson’s survey (Appendix C) and the research hypotheses outlined
in chapter 1 using the matrix in Table 2.
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Table 2 - Research Hypothesis versus Survey Questions Matrix
Martinson
1
8
2
3
4
5
6
7
10
11

12
14
13

16

Alsop
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Research Hypothesis
Validates respondent to survey
Not applicable to study due to PIN policy
1, 2
1
1, 2
1, 2
1, 2
2
Insight into common techniques
3
1, 2
4
4
4
4
Usability Issue
4
4
4
1, 2
5
5
3
3
3
5
5
AFCA request
AFCA request
AFCA request
AFCA request
Future Research
Future Research
Future Research
Future Research
Comments
Personal Info
Personal Info
Personal Info
Personal Info
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Survey questions 3 through 11 and questions 23 through 25 for this research
directly matched questions that were asked during Martinson’s research. These
investigative questions will serve to compare the changes in usage and policy as affected
by the implementation of the CAC and PIN authentication method. Questions 12 through
22 and questions 26-27 will answer additional questions and confirm hypothesis relating
specifically CAC control. Questions 28 through 31 were added specifically at the request
of the research sponsor, the Air Force Communications Agency. Questions 37 through
40 serve to identify participant characteristics.
The data from the survey were imported into Excel 2003 Spreadsheet and
analyzed using MINITAB statistical analysis software. The analysis was directly
compared against results for Martinson’s research questions:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Do you use passwords?
Has your password ever been compromised?
Do you recycle or use similar passwords for different applications?
In the last year, have you written down a password?
In the last year, have you ever shared a password with friends, family, coworkers or others?
How do you remember passwords?
Have you ever voluntarily changed a password so that it is easier to
remember?
Do you feel that password procedures and parameters are a nuisance?
How many passwords are you currently remembering/using?
How would you characterize your organization’s training and education
relating to the creation of passwords?
Do you follow the password procedures based on organizational
guidance?
Do you feel the password policies of your organization are burdensome?

Limits of the Data
The data was gathered using a format that does not allow participants to go back
and change their answers. This technique therefore does not guarantee that the
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participant’s feelings at the end of the survey represent how exactly they answered the
question during the survey. In other words, it does not capture participants change in
attitudes or second thoughts about previous questions based on questions that are
encountered later in the survey. One question that was not represented in this survey that
was asked in Martinson’s research was, “Are there any negative consequences to not
changing passwords regularly?” This question did not relate to any of the research
hypotheses in this study. In Martinson’s research, he noted that the question, “Has your
password ever been compromised?” was ambiguous, as the user might not know whether
their password has been compromised. This is also true with the research question in this
study, “Has you PIN ever been compromised?” I am keeping this question in the study in
order to determine whether the participants’ confidence in the PIN is similar to the
confidence levels shown for passwords in Martinson’s research.
Additionally, because the data collected pertained to a two-factor authentication
method that had implemented only six months prior to the survey period, we cannot be
sure that this data positively reflects the steady state.
All data was inspected for errors and omissions before analysis.
Chapter Overview
This research study will use an anonymous web-based survey of active duty and
civilian military members that are using the CAC and PIN authentication method for
network access control. The survey was designed as a longitudinal between-cases panel
study with the independent variable for the cases being the authentication method.
Threats to internal and construct validity were also addressed. The measures of the study
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and the limits of the data were then identified, as were the methods for comparison in
order to answer the research hypotheses in chapter 1.
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IV. Analysis
In this chapter, we analyze the data collected and compare applicable questions
directly to the results of Martinson’s research. First, we will review the responses for
each survey question in detail. We then analyze each of the research hypotheses, directly
comparing our results against the results of Martinson’s research where appropriate, with
statistical analysis tests.
Survey Question Response Overview
Survey Question One
The first investigative question asks, “Do you use a Common Access Card (CAC,
aka Military ID) and Personal Identification Number (PIN) to access the network at
work?” Possible answers for this question were “Yes” and “No”. There was a 100
percent response to this question with 96.8 percent of the participants answering “Yes”.
This question serves to identify those individuals who are the target of this research.
Those who answered ‘No’ did not take the rest of the survey.
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Survey Question Two
The second investigative question asks, “Were you issued a PIN, or did you pick
your PIN yourself?” This question will serve to determine whether choosing your own
PIN has an affect on PIN usage. The results show that 96.4 percent of the respondents
were able to pick their own PIN number. This is consistent with the technique in which
the USAF uses to assign PIN numbers to CACs (DMDC 2006). Eleven respondents
stated that they did not pick their own PIN, which is at odds with the CAC issuance
procedures and leads me to believe that they did not understand the question.

Survey Question Two
Were you issued a PIN, or did you pick your PIN yourself?
1 = 'Issued PIN'; 2 = 'Picked My Own PIN'
1

2
96.4856
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n = 313; Freq: '1' = 11; '2' = 302
Percent within all data.

Figure 5 - Were you issued a PIN, or did you pick your PIN yourself?
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Survey Question Three
The third investigative question asks, “Have you ever changed your PIN so that it
is easier to remember?” This question was similar to a question asked during
Martinson’s research, “Have you ever voluntarily changed a password so that it is easier
to remember?” Martinson’s research showed that 68.6 percent answered “Yes”, 30.2
percent answered “No”, and 1.2 percent answered “Don’t Know.” In our research, there
is a reversal of this trend, with 25.2 percent of respondents stating that they have changed
their PIN so that it is easier to remember. This could be due to the fact that users do not
have to change their PIN on a regular basis and are allowed to select their own PIN
during the CAC issuance process.

Survey Question Three
Have you ever changed your PIN so that it is easier to remember?
1 = 'Yes'; 2 = 'No"; 3 = 'Don't Know'
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Figure 6 - Have you ever changed your PIN so that it is easier to remember?
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Survey Question Four
The fourth investigative question asks, “Has your PIN ever been compromised?”
This question was similar to a question asked during Martinson’s research, “Has your
password ever been compromised?” Martinson’s research showed that 5.3 percent
answered ‘Yes’, 69.5 percent answered ‘No’, and 25.1 percent answered ‘Don’t Know’.
In our research, respondents tend to be much more confident in the integrity of their PINs
with 93.9 percent answering ‘No’ to this question.

Survey Question Four
Has your PIN ever been compromised?
1 = 'Yes'; 2 = 'No"; 3 = 'Don't Know'
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Figure 7 - Has your PIN ever been compromised?
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Survey Question Five
The fifth investigative question asks, “Do you use the same PIN for multiple
applications? Example: ATM card, Online accounts, Credit Cards.” This question is
similar to a question asked during Martinson’s research, “Do you recycle or use similar
passwords for different applications?” Martinson’s research showed that 96.2 percent
answered ‘Yes’. In our research, only 25.6 percent answered ‘Yes’ and 74.4 percent of
the respondents answered ‘No’, a distinct difference from the results in Martinson’s
research and an indicator that a CAC and PIN authentication technique can increase the
level of security of a network by reducing the vulnerability to PIN compromise.

Survey Question Five
Do you use the same PIN for multiple applications?
1 = 'Yes'; 2 = 'No'
1

2

Percent

80

74.4409

80

70

70

60

60

50

50

40

40

30

30

25.5591

20

20

10

10

0

1

2
Q5

n = 313; Freq: '1' = 80; '2' = 233
Percent within all data.

Figure 8 - Do you use the same PIN for multiple applications?
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Survey Question Six
The sixth investigative question asked, “In the last year, have you written down
your PIN(s)?” This question was similar to a question asked during Martinson’s
research, “In the last year, have you written down a password?” Martinson’s research
showed that 71.3 percent answered ‘Yes’ and 28.7 percent answered ‘No’. In our
research, the results were reversed with 21.4 percent answered ‘Yes’ and 78.6 percent
answering ‘No’. Again, it appears that the respondents treat their PINs more securely
than they did their passwords.

Survey Question Six
In the last year, have you written down your PIN(s)
1 = 'Yes'; 2 = 'No'
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Figure 9 - In the last year, have you written down your PIN(s)?
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Survey Question Seven
The seventh investigative question asked, “In the last year, have you shared a PIN
with friends, family, co-workers, or others?” This question was similar to a question
asked during Martinson’s research, “In the last year, have you ever shared a password
with friends, family, co-workers or others?” Martinson’s research showed that 39.1
percent answered ‘Yes’ and 60.9 percent answered ‘No’. In our research, the results
showed that only 3.6 percent answered ‘Yes’ and 96.1 percent answering ‘No’. This
could be attributed to the fact that PINs are useless without the associated CAC and users
are less likely to share their CAC with others as it could affect their ability to access the
base and base services.

Survey Question Seven
In the last year, have you shared a PIN with friends, family, co-workers, or others?
1 = 'Yes'; 2 = 'No'; 999 = 'No Response'
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Figure 10 - In the last year, have you shared a PIN with friends, family, co-workers, or others?
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Survey Question Eight
The eighth investigative question asked, “Do you use a familiar date, age, SSN,
sequence (i.e. 1234), telephone number, street address, or pattern to remember your
PIN?” This question was similar to a question asked during Martinson’s research, “How
do you remember your password?” Martinson’s research showed that almost 100 percent
of the respondents used some technique to remember their password. In our research, the
results showed an almost even split with 47 percent answered ‘Yes’ and 52.7 percent
answering ‘No’. This question may have confused the respondents as 76.2 percent of the
382 that answered this question ‘No’, then answered question 9 of the survey, “What
“Technique” do you use?” with the technique that they used. Unless they are writing
their PIN down (21.4 percent according to question six), they would need to use some
technique in order to recall the PIN later. The techniques identified in question 9 are
included in Appendix D.
Survey Question Eight
Do you use a familiar date, age, SSN,..., or pattern to remember you PIN?
1 = 'Yes'; 2 = 'No'; 999 = 'No Response'
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Figure 11 - Do you use a familiar date, age, SSN, sequence, phone number, address, or pattern to remember your PIN?
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Survey Question Ten
The tenth investigative question asked, “Do you feel that the CAC and PIN
network authentication procedures and parameters are a nuisance?” This question is
related to question 24, “Do you feel the PIN policies (creation and use) are
burdensome?”, and question 26, “Do you feel that using the CAC and PIN authentication
method is burdensome?” of this survey. Additionally, it was similar to a question asked
during Martinson’s research, “Do you feel that password parameters are a nuisance?”
Martinson’s research showed that 62.1 percent answered ‘Yes’ and 36.7 percent
answered ‘No’. In our research, the results were reversed with 34.2 percent answered
‘Yes’ and 57.7 percent answering ‘No’. This implies that the password policies, such as
the requirement for long complex passwords and the requirement to change them
frequently were more of a nuisance than the burdens imposed under the new
authentication technique.
Survey Question Ten
Do you feel that the CAC/PIN network authentication procedures are a nuisance?
1 = 'Yes'; 2 = 'No'; 3 = 'No Opinion'; 999 = 'No Response'
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Figure 12 - Do you feel that the CAC and PIN network authentication procedures and parameters are a nuisance?
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Survey Question Eleven
The eleventh investigative question asked, “How many PINs (in addition to the
one for your CAC) are you currently using?” This question was similar to a question
asked during Martinson’s research, “How many passwords are you currently
remembering/using?” Martinson’s research showed that 19.8 percent were remembering
up to four passwords, 50.6 percent were remembering 5 to 10 passwords, and 22.5
percent were remembering 11 to 20 passwords. In our research, the results showed that
40.6 percent were remembering 1 to 4 PINs, 42.3 percent were remembering 5 to 10
PINs, and 16.7 percent were remembering more than 10 PINs. It appears that
remembering a PIN will be less of a burden than trying to remember a password, as users
typically have a fewer number of PINs that they have to remember.
Survey Question Eleven
How many PINs (in addition to the one for your CAC) are you currently using?
1 = '1-2'; 2 = '3-4'; 3 = '5-6'; 4 = '7-8'; 5 = '9-10'; 6 = '10+'; 999 = 'No Response'
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Figure 13 - How many PINs (in addition to the one for your CAC) are you currently using?
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Survey Question Twelve
The twelfth investigative question asked, “With the new CAC/PIN authentication,
do you have to leave your CAC in the card reader while accessing the network?” In our
research, the results showed that 86 percent of the respondents have to leave their CAC in
the card reader while they are logged in to the network. 6.9 percent of respondents say
that they do not have to leave their CAC in the reader and 6.8 percent state that they only
have to do it sometimes. The respondents that have to leave their CAC in the reader in
order to stay logged in will be more likely to feel certain adverse affects of the new
authentication technique.

Survey Question Twelve
Do you have to leave your CAC in the card reader while accessing the network?
1 = 'Yes'; 2 = 'No'; 3 = "Sometimes'; 999 = 'No Response'
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Figure 14 - Do you have to leave your CAC in the card reader while accessing the network?
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Survey Question Thirteen
The thirteenth investigative question asked, “In the last 6 months, have you
inadvertently left your CAC behind in the computer?” In our research, the results
showed that 66.8 percent of the respondents have left their CAC behind. As the CAC is
the primary method of accessing the base and base services, this can have a profound
effect on the respondent’s quality of life. Without the CAC, they will now have to return
to work to retrieve the CAC if they want to access any of the base services, and if they
have already left the military base, they will have to find someone to escort them back
onto the base. Additionally, they now are no longer in control of their card, which then
poses a physical security risk.

Survey Question Thirteen
In the last 6 months, have you inadvertently left your CAC behind in the computer?
1 = 'Yes'; 2 = 'No'; 999 = 'No Response'
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Figure 15 - In the last 6 months, have you inadvertently left your CAC behind in the computer?
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Questions fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen were only asked to those who responded
‘Yes’ to question thirteen, “Have you inadvertently left your CAC behind in the
computer?” For these questions, our sample size was n = 484.
Survey Question Fourteen
The fourteenth investigative question asked, “In the last 6 months, how many
times have you left your CAC at work, in the computer?” For those individuals that have
left their CAC behind, we wanted to get an idea of how frequently this occurred during
the last six months. In our research, the results showed that 19 percent of the respondents
have left their CAC behind five or more times and 78 percent of the respondents have left
their CAC behind more than once. Being the primary method of access to military bases
and base services, this could be a potential security threat and an inconvenience to the
user.
Survey Question Fourteen
In the last 6 months, how many times have you left your CAC at work, in the computer?
1 = '1'; 2 = '2 times'; 3 = '3 times'; 4 = '4 times'; 5 = '5 or more times'; 999 = 'No Response'
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Figure 16 - In the last 6 months, how many times have you left your CAC at work, in the computer?
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Survey Question Fifteen
The fifteenth investigative question asked, “How much did the new CAC/PIN
authentication technique contribute to this?” 69.4 percent of the respondents stated that
the new CAC/PIN authentication technique contributed ‘Greatly’ to them leaving their
CAC behind, with an additional 20.2 percent saying that it was at least a factor. It
appears that users are still adjusting to having to use their CAC for network
authentication and as such, habits such as remembering to take their CAC out of the
reader are not yet ingrained.

Survey Question Fifteen
In refrence to #14, How much did the new CAC/PIN authentication technique contribute to this?
1 = 'Greatly'; 2 = 'Moderately'; 3 = 'Slightly'; 4 = 'Not at all'; 999 = 'No Response'
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Figure 17 - In reference to #14, How much did the new CAC/PIN authentication technique contribute to this?
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Survey Question Sixteen
The sixteenth investigative question asked, “When you left your CAC at work,
did it cause you problems in accessing the base or base services?” 62.6 percent of the
respondents had problems accessing the base or base services due to leaving their CAC
behind in the computer. It appears that there are certainly problems associated with
having users use their primary identification method for network authentication.

Survey Question Sixteen
When you left your CAC at work, did it cause you problems in accessing the base or base services?
1 = 'Yes'; 2 = 'No'; 999 = 'No Response'
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Figure 18 - When you left your CAC at work, did it cause you problems in accessing the base or base services?
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Survey Question Seventeen
The seventeenth investigative question asked, “Since implementation of the CAC
and PIN to authenticate on the network, has your CAC been lost, stolen, or misplaced?”
Results showed that 6.1 percent of the respondents have had their CAC lost or stolen.

Survey Question Seventeen
Has your CAC been lost, stolen, or misplaced?
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Figure 19 - Has your CAC been lost, stolen, or misplaced?
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Questions eighteen and nineteen were only asked to those who responded ‘Yes’ to
question seventeen, “Since implementation of the CAC and PIN to authenticate on the
network, has your CAC been lost, stolen, or misplaced?” For these questions, our sample
population was n = 44.
Survey Question Eighteen
The eighteenth investigative question asked, “In reference to the previous
question, how many times has your CAC been lost, stolen, or misplaced?” 77.3 percent
of the respondents only had their CAC lost, stolen, or misplaced once.

Survey Question Eighteen
How many times has your CAC been lost, stolen, or misplaced?
1 = '1'; 2 = '2 times'; 3 = '3 times'; 4 = '4 times'; 5 = '5 or more times'; 999 = 'No Response'
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Figure 20 - How many times has your CAC been lost, stolen, or misplaced?
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Survey Question Nineteen
The nineteenth investigative question asked, “In reference to the previous
question, how much did the new CAC/PIN authentication technique contribute to the
loss, theft, or misplacement?” Our results showed that the new CAC and PIN
authentication method contributed to 40.9 percent of the CAC loss and thefts. The
implication here is that the new authentication technique will cause an approximately 72
percent increase in the number of CACs that are lost or stolen and will require
replacement. With the average CAC issuance taking anywhere from 12 to 15 minutes,
not including wait times, this can cause a significant additional burden on the Military
Personnel Flight as well as a significant loss in productivity of the user.

Survey Question Nineteen
In reference to #18, how much did the new CAC/PIN authentication technique contribute...
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Figure 21 - In reference to #18, how much did the new CAC/PIN authentication technique contribute?
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Survey Question Twenty
The twentieth investigative question asked, “In the last year, have you let
someone (Co-worker, Friend) borrow your CAC?” This question is related to question
seven of our survey, “In the last year, have you shared a PIN with friends, family, coworkers, or others?” and together is similar to a question asked during Martinson’s
research, “In the last year, have you ever shared a password with friends, family, coworkers or others?” In order for respondents to share their network account with another
user, they would have to let someone borrow their CAC and share their PIN with them.
Martinson’s research showed that 39.1 percent answered ‘Yes’ and 60.9 percent
answered ‘No’. Our results showed that only 1.2 percent of the respondent has shared
their CAC in the last year. This was similar to the response for question 7, where 3.6
percent of the respondents have shared their PIN. It appears at this point that the sharing
of user accounts has decreased dramatically due to the new authentication method.
Survey Question Twenty
In the last year, have you let someone borrow your CAC?
1 = 'Yes'; 2 = 'No'; 999 = 'No Response'
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Figure 22- In the last year, have you let someone borrow your CAC?
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Survey Question Twenty-One
The twenty-first investigative question asked, “To access your work email
account remotely (e.g. Home, TDY, In Transit), do you have to use a CAC reader?”
Results showed that 42.9 percent of respondents are required to have a CAC reader
present in order for them to access their work email accounts from remote locations. All
other respondents either do not try, and thus do not know, to access their work email
accounts from remote locations or are still allowed to logon remotely via Webmail or a
Virtual Private Network (VPN) connection without the need for a CAC.

Survey Question Twenty-One
To access your work email account remotely, do you have to use a CAC reader?
1 = 'Yes'; 2 = 'No'; 3 = 'Don't Know'; 999 = 'No Response'
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Figure 23- To access your work email account remotely, do you have to use a CAC reader?
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Survey Question Twenty-Two
The twenty-second investigative question asked, “Since implementation of the
CAC/PIN authentication, how would you rate the ease of accessing the network
remotely?” In figure 24, our results are based on all respondents’ answers regardless of
whether remote access requires a CAC. In figure 25, our results are based only on those
that have to use a CAC reader to remotely access their work email (i.e., they answered
‘Yes’ on question twenty-one). It appears that mandatory CAC use from a remote
location has a significant impact on the user.
S u r v e y Q u e s t i o n T w e n t y -T w o ( A l l R e s p o n s e s )
H o w w o u ld y o u r a te th e e a s e o f a c c e s s in g th e n e tw o r k r e m o te ly?
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Figure 24 - How would you rate the ease of accessing the network remotely?
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Figure 25 - How would you rate the ease of accessing the network remotely?
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Survey Question Twenty-Three
The twenty-third investigative question asked, “How would you characterize your
organization’s training and education relating to the creation of PINs and the use of the
CAC card for network authentication?” This question was similar to a question asked
during Martinson’s research, “How would you characterize your organization’s training
and education relating to the creation of passwords?” Martinson’s research showed 7.7
percent thought is was ‘Outstanding’, 31.7 percent rated it ‘Good’, 45 percent rated it
‘Adequate’, 8.6 percent rated it ‘Needs Improvement’, and 5 percent rated it ‘Poor’. This
is very similar to our findings (see figure 26). It appears that the level of training related
to the new authentication technique has not changed significantly from the training for
the previous authentication method.

Survey Question Twenty-Three
How would you characterize your Org. traning and education relating to PIN creation and CAC use?
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Figure 26 - How would you characterize your Org. training and education relating to PIN creation and CAC use?
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Survey Question Twenty-Four
The twenty-fourth investigative question asked, “Do you feel the PIN policies
(creation and use) are burdensome?” This question is related to survey question ten and
survey question twenty-six and is similar to a question asked during Martinson’s
research, “Do you feel the password policies of your organization are burdensome?”
Martinson’s research showed that 50.9 percent considered the password policies a burden
and 44.4 percent did not consider it a burden. In our research, the results showed a
decline with only 32.3 percent of the respondents considering the PIN policies a burden.

Survey Question Twenty-Four
Do you feel the PIN policies (creation and use) are burdensome?
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Figure 27 - Do you feel the PIN policies (creation and use) are burdensome?
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Survey Question Twenty-Five
The twenty-fifth investigative question asked, “Do you follow CAC/PIN
procedures based on organizational guidance?” This question was similar to a question
asked during Martinson’s research, “Do you follow the password procedures based on
organizational guidance?” Martinson’s research showed that 84 percent answered ‘Yes’.
Our results were very similar with 81.8 percent of respondents answering ‘Yes’.

Survey Question Twenty-Five
Do you follow CAC/PIN procedures based on organizational guidance?
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Figure 28 - Do you follow CAC/PIN procedures based on organizational guidance?
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Survey Question Twenty-Six
The Twenty-sixth investigative question asked, “Do you feel that using the CAC
and PIN authentication method is burdensome?” This question is related to survey
question ten, “Do you feel that the CAC and PIN network authentication procedures and
parameters are a nuisance?”, and survey question twenty-four, “Do you feel the PIN
policies (creation and use) are burdensome?”, and is also similar to a question asked
during Martinson’s research, “Do you feel the password policies of your organization are
burdensome?” Martinson’s research showed that 50.9 percent considered the password
policies a burden and 44.4 percent did not consider it a burden. In our research, the
results showed a decline with only 37.1 percent of the respondents considering the PIN
policies a burden.

Survey Question Twenty-Six
Do you feel that using the CAC and PIN authentication method is burdensome?
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Figure 29 - Do you feel that using the CAC and PIN authentication method is burdensome?
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Survey Question Twenty-Seven
The Twenty-seventh investigative question asked, “If you think it is burdensome
(referring to the previous question), why?” Seven choices and a comment field followed
this question. The users were allowed to select more than one reason. The results of the
selectable options are located in figure 30. Respondent comments were categorized and
the number of responses for each category are located in figure 31.

Percent
(n=725)
36.4
35.5
32.6
24.8
21.4
19.7
19.5

Reason (selecting all that apply)
Small errands in the office require taking the CAC with me
Accessing my email remotely is more difficult
If I forget or lose my CAC, I can’t access the network to do my job
Have to get CAC from wallet, purse, etc.
I’m always forgetting to take the CAC card out of the card reader
I don’t think it is burdensome
Other Reasons

Figure 30 – If you think CAC/PIN authentication is burdensome, why?

Response #
(n=170)
37
24
18
15
12
11
8

Written responses under category “other” (generalized categories)
Remote access to email is difficult or impossible
Takes too long to Logon/Unlock computer
Have to enter PIN multiple times
Have to get CAC from wallet, purse, etc.
Concerns about physical vulnerability of the CAC
CAC is being damaged by constant use
MPF replacement takes forever

Figure 31 - If you think CAC/PIN authentication is burdensome, why? Comments
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Questions twenty-eight through thirty-one were included in the research study at
the behest of the sponsoring organization, the Air Force Communications Agency. While
the results provide insight into the respondent’s views between the Logon ID and
Password authentication technique and the new CAC and PIN authentication method,
they are not directly related to the purpose of this study.
Survey Question Twenty-Eight
The twenty-eighth investigative question asked, “Do you believe the previous
method of securing network access (Logon ID and Password) was a sufficient means of
ensuring network security?” The results showed that 62.5 percent of the respondents
believed that the old authentication technique to be sufficient for network security.

Survey Question Twenty-Eight
Do y ou believ e the prev ious method of securing network access was a sufficient means of ensuring network security ?
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Figure 32 - Do you believe the previous method of securing network access was a sufficient means of ensuring network security?
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Survey Question Twenty-Nine
The twenty-ninth investigative question asked, “Do you believe that using a CAC
to logon to the network is more secure than Logon ID and Password?” The results
showed that 65.1 percent of the respondents believed that the CAC and PIN
authentication technique is more secure than the Logon ID and Password authentication
technique.

Survey Question Twenty-Nine
Do you believe that using a CAC to logon to the network is more secure than Logon ID and Password?
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Figure 33 - Do you believe that using a CAC to logon to the network is more secure than Logon ID and Password?
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Survey Question Thirty
The thirtieth investigative question asked, “Do you believe using the CAC to
logon to the network is: (choose one):”, and then offered two options. The results
showed that 26.5 percent of the respondents believed that the CAC and PIN
authentication technique is “An Inconvenience’ and 71.4 percent believe it to be “A
Necessary Security Evolutionary Requirement.’
Survey Question Thirty
Do you believe using the CAC to logon to the network is: (choose one):
1 = 'An Inconvenience'; 2 = 'A Necessary Security Evolutionary Requirement'; 999 = 'No Response'
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Figure 34 - Do you believe using the CAC to logon to the network is: (choose one):
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Survey Question Thirty-One
The thirty-first investigative question asked, “Do you believe that network access
conveniences take priority over security?” The results showed that 11.2 percent of the
respondents believed their convenience takes priority over network security.

Survey Question Thirty-One
Do you believe that network access conveniences take priority over security?
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Figure 35 - Do you believe that network access conveniences take priority over security?
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Questions thirty-two and thirty-three were included to determine respondent’s
interests in possible future authentication techniques.
Survey Question Thirty-Two
The thirty-second investigative question asked, “If you had a choice of methods to
gain access to the network, which would you prefer?” Our results showed 38.2 percent,
the highest proportion, of the respondents are interested in utilizing their fingerprints for
authentication. This is higher than the Logon ID and Password technique at 17.66
percent and the CAC and PIN authentication technique at 24.1 percent.

Survey Question Thirty-Two
If you had a choice of methods to gain access to the network, which would you prefer?
1='Log/Psd'; 2='CAC/PIN'; 3='Fingerprint'; 4='Hand Geometry'; 5='Iris'; 6='Other'; 7='No Opinion'; 999='No Response'
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Figure 36 - If you had a choice of methods to gain access to the network, which would you prefer?
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Survey Question Thirty-Three
The thirty-third investigative question asked, “Would you prefer a separate card
(similar to CAC, but not for ID) specifically for network authentication?” Our results
showed that 54.8 percent of the respondents did not want a separate card for network
authentication.

Survey Question Thirty-Three
Would you prefer a separate card (similar to CAC, but not for ID) specifically for network authentication?
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Figure 37 - Would you prefer a separate card (similar to CAC, but not for ID) specifically for network authentication?

Questions thirty-four to thirty-six asked respondents for their general comments
regarding the CAC and PIN authentication technique in addition to specific inquires
about increasing security and usability. I think that I might have biased the results
slightly as many respondents stated that they like the ideas mentioned in questions 32 and
33 of the survey. The results are summarized below. I removed responses that identified
specific organizations or included inflammatory comments.
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Survey Question Thirty-Four
The thirty-fourth investigative question asked, “What do you think could increase
usability/accessibility of the CAC/PIN method without sacrificing security?” The list
below represents the common responses to this question. It should be noted that some
responses did not fit this question as they are related to other authentication techniques
(e.g. biometrics). Those responses belonged under question thirty-five.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Ability to remove card after logon (swipe card/RFID enable cards)
Ability to logon to more than one computer (and more than 1 at a time)
Build more durable cards (increased use forcing replacement sooner)
Speed up logon/unlock process (currently takes up to 30 sec)
CAC enable more DoD sites (users still have to remember passwords)
Reduce the number of CAC authentications (should only have to
authenticate CAC once when you logon, then it should be good for all
other locations, websites that you visit)
Ease remote access capability (many users are frustrated with inability to
check their email while away from the office)
Allow base to base use (should be able to access email from any
military/DoD installation with your CAC)
One email address that follows users everywhere (would reduce
requirement to reset CAC every time you PCS and allow you to access
encrypted emails from previous assignments)
Disable login ID and password (some users still have to change a
password every ninety days, even though they use the CAC and PIN
authentication technique)
Another card for network access separate from our ID card
Allow lanyards to be attached to CAC (requires hole punch)

Survey Question Thirty-Five
The thirty-fifth investigative question asked, “What do you think could increase
security without sacrificing usability?” The list below represents the common responses
to this question.
•

Implement Biometric authentication techniques (many respondents were
concerned about inability to access base or network if they did not have
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•
•
•
•
•

their CAC on them. Biometrics would reduce number of CACs left in
office and would not require someone to return home if they forgot their
CAC)
Greater flexibility with PIN creation (remove guidelines)
Implement a two-tiered authentication method that uses a USB based
token. This would eliminate the need to install a CAC reader at remote
location as most computers come standard with USB ports.
Implement a three-tiered authentication system (what I know, what I have,
what I am). This would require the use of a PIN, CAC, and a Biometric.
Standardize CAC and PIN authentication across commands/bases
(depending on where you go, implementation standards are determined by
command and local installation policies)
Block familiar PIN patterns (SSN, Birthdate, etc)

Survey Question Thirty-Six
The thirty-sixth investigative question asked, “Please share any additional
comments?” The list below represents the highlights of those responses that are not
addressed in the previous two questions.
•

•

•

CAC/PIN are causing a physical security problem
o “Many people in the section leave their CACs in the reader when
they step out of the office for a few minutes”
o “I have left my CAC card in for short periods of time (e.g. go to
the bathroom, get a cup of coffee)”
o “Most of us will not pull our CAC every time we leave our
computers because we just don’t think about it and it takes so long
to log back on…”
o What kind of screening is done on maintenance, housekeeping and
cleanup personnel? As these people have access to most areas, it
would be very easy for one of them to pocket an ID left in a CAC
reader and sell it to someone whose intentions are bad
Respondents suggested ways to reduce CAC leave behinds
o Have computers emit an audible warning during the logout process
if the card is left in the reader
o Organizations post signs by the exits reminding people to take their
CAC with them when they leave the building
o Automatically locking the machine when user removes their CAC
o Use keyboards with attached CAC readers
Concerns about the different treatment based on rank
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•

•

•

•

o Burdens go unnoticed by senior leadership because most senior
officers have Blackberries that allow them to send/receive emails
without the use of mandatory CAC login
More remote access concerns
o “Do we really all need to check email at home? ... If someone
really needs you they can use a phone. For senior officers and
commanders, maybe we can find a way to access email from
home, but NOT the entire network.”
o “And lack of remote access (while TDY/on leave) is significantly
slowing down our communication while away from home station.
That needs to be fixed ASAP. I’m a large squadron CC and
remote access (web or Blackberry) greatly helps getting/providing
timely direction, especially during crisis events.”
o “Since the implementation of CAC card authentication, I can
access the Outlook Web Access (OWA) only through my work
PC, and that really defeats the mobility purpose of OWA access.”
o “Even if you have a USB plug-in CAC reader the user level that
non-IT people set on most networked computers will not allow
hardware to be added”
Inconsistent application of standards
o “My only issue is the command policy of maintaining a password
that I never use and cannot remember.”
o “Please push activation of CAC/PIN login for OWA access”
o “There has been no determination as to who can and will receive
CAC readers; so most of the population has been locked out”
o “I’m a Squadron CC and I can’t get OWA at home because I don’t
have a CAC reader at home and the AF hasn’t issued one. The AF
should pay for it-not me. With a busy lifestyle this should be
afforded to CCs. You axe my access, but don’t give me the out.
I’ll figure it out and get a CAC reader, but good grief.”
o “While we are required to use the CAC/PIN we are still required to
change passwords every 60 days. The only time you use that
password is if there is a problem and you CAC/PIN are not
working.”
o “Why is it that we still have to log in with user name and password
plus the CAC/PIN.”
o “Here at ----- AFB, we cannot access .mil email accounts
remotely…”
CAC transportability
o Current method of certificate based on e-mail leads to the danger
of losing valuable information if it was sent encrypted and my email address changes, i.e. when I PCS.”
Unique environments and the CAC
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•

o “When you have to jump on and off the network on different
machines all day, it’s easy to forget your card and difficult to use
the network”
o I work in an environment where we dedicate computers to a
specific duty position. There are times when a person at a specific
position has to leave the office. If that vacant position is then
tasked with a request and another person needs to fill that position,
the vacated computer may or may not be available for use.
Additionally, it is very difficult to do so because the person trying
to cover dual positions doesn’t have 2 CACs.
o “I am a reservist and civilian who needs to access to separate
networks and can not.”
o “Unable to obtain Host Nation approval for issuance of CAC cards
to local national employees in some countries due to concerns over
biometric data that is required”
o “big issue with allowing local nationals having CAC…many still
do not feel that they should have to use one. Their feeling is that
the card contains personal information that should not be made
available.”
CAC a single point of failure?
o “I am very uncomfortable having everything tied to a single item
like the CAC/ID card. It represents a single failure point for many
uses all of which become very difficult should the ID be stolen,
damaged or lost.”
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Demographics
The typical respondent was a 41-50 years old (38.6 percent), male (70.2 percent),
and does not work in computer or network security (82.5 percent). The results are in
figures 38 to 41. One item of note: each participant works for the military in either an
active or a civilian capacity. This will lend credibility to the findings as these individuals
are respected for their integrity and ability to follow rules and policies (Martinson 2005).
S ur v e y Q ue s tio n Thir ty -S e v e n
W ha t is your a ge ?
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Figure 38 – What is your age?
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Figure 39 – What is your gender?
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Figure 40 – Job or Occupation

Survey Question Forty
Is your job now or was your job ever in the computer or network security industry?
1 = 'Yes'; 2 = 'No'; 3 = 'Don't Know'; 999 = 'No Response'
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Figure 41 – Is your job now or was your job ever in the computer or network security industry?
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Data Analysis
This section is dedicated to analyzing the results of the survey against the research
hypothesis of this study. Once again, the research hypotheses are:
1) The implementation of a two-factor authentication technique will increase
the effectiveness of network authentication as related to human factors.
2) The vulnerabilities that affect a strictly password based authentication
method will not have an effect on the PIN portion of a two-factor
authentication method?
3) Individuals will be more likely to adhere to policy guidance under the new
authentication method as compared to password authentication.
4) The new authentication technique will contribute to a loss in worker
productivity and smart cards.
5) Accessibility of the networks will decline as individuals find it more
difficult to perform job tasks away from the primary workplace (i.e. TDY,
Leave) due to the requirement of having a token to authenticate.
Research Hypotheses One and Two
Survey questions 3-7, 11, and 20 of this research pertained specifically to the first
hypothesis, “The implementation of a two-factor authentication technique will increase
the effectiveness of network authentication as related to human factors.” Survey
questions 3, 5-7, 11, and 20 of this research pertained specifically to the second
hypothesis, “The vulnerabilities that affect a strictly password based authentication
method will not have an effect on the PIN portion of a two-factor authentication
method?” We analyzed these hypotheses with a direct comparison of the survey results
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between Martinson’s research and ours (Table 3). Because the independent variable (i.e.
the authentication technique) is nominal (or categorical) as is the dependent variables (i.e.
yes, no, don’t know), I will use a Chi-Square Goodness-of-Fit test to analyze each of the
related questions and whether or not the results are significant around α = .05. The initial
indications seem to show that the CAC and PIN authentication technique enhances
authentication effectiveness and that some of the vulnerabilities highlighted during
Martinson’s research show a decline with this new authentication method.
In response to the question, “Have you ever changed your PIN/Password so that
it is easier to remember?” The hypotheses are:
•
•

Ho: The proportion of password changes and PIN changes are the same
Ha: The proportion of password changes and PIN changes are different

The proportion of users answering ‘Yes’ to this question dropped from 68.6
percent to 24.9 percent (Table 3). Utilizing the chi-square analysis (Table 4), we get a
chi-square of 291.2 and a p-value of 0.000. We must reject the null hypothesis and
conclude that the proportion of password changes and PIN changes for ease of
remembrance are significantly different. Fewer users changing their PIN to some pattern
(e.g., SSN, birthdates, etc…) that would allow them an easier ability to remember,
reduces the vulnerability to an outside user guessing the PIN based on some familiar
aspect of the user.
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Table 3 - Research Hypothesis 1/2 Raw Data Analysis
Question Asked

Question

(M - Martinson; A - Alsop)

Number

Yes

No

Don't Know

Have you ever changed your Password(M)/PIN(A) so
that it is easier to remember?

M-Q7

68.6

30.2

1.2

A-Q3

24.9

74.4

0.6

M-Q2

5.3

69.5

25.1
5.8

Has your Password(M)/PIN(A) ever been compromised

Response
No Response

A-Q4

0.3

93.9

Do you use the same Password(M)/PIN(A) for multiple
applications

M-Q3

96.2

3.6

0.3

A-Q5

25.6

74.4

0

In the last year, have you written down your
Passwords(M)/PINs(A)?

M-Q4

71.3

28.7

A-Q6

21.4

78.6

In the last year, have you shared a
Password(M)/PIN(A) with friends, family, co-workers, or
others?

M-Q5

39.1

60.9

0

A-Q7

3.6

96.1

0.3

A-Q20

1.2

98.3

0.4

1-4

5-10

10+

No Response

M-Q10

19.8

50.6

22.5

0.3

A-Q11

40.6

42.3

16.7

0

In the last year, have you let someone (Co-worker,
Friend) borrow your CAC?

How many Passwords(M)/PINs(A) are you currently
using?

In response to the question, “Has your PIN/Password ever been compromised?”
The hypotheses are:
•
•

Ho: Password and PIN susceptibility to compromises are the same
Ha: Password and PIN susceptibility to compromise are different

The proportion of users answering ‘Yes’ to this question dropped from 5.3
percent to 0.3 percent (Table 3). More remarkable is the increase of users responding
‘No’ from 69.5 percent to 93.9 percent. Utilizing the chi-square analysis (Table 4), we
get a chi-square of 88.4 and a p-value of 0.000. We must reject the null hypothesis and
conclude that Password and PIN susceptibility to compromise are different. It appears
that in addition to a significant drop in the instances of compromise, there is significant
increase in user’s confidence that their PIN was not compromised.
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Table 4 - Research Hypothesis 1/2 Chi-Sq Analysis
Question Asked (M - Martinson; A - Alsop)
Chi-Sq Analysis
Have you ever changed your
Password(M)/PIN(A) so that it is easier to
remember?
n=313 ; Chi-Sq = 291.2; P-Value = 0.000
Has your Password(M)/PIN(A) ever been
compromised
n=313 ; Chi-Sq = 88.4; P-Value = 0.000
Do you use the same Password(M)/PIN(A)
for multiple applications
n=313 ; Chi-Sq = 4579.18; P-Value = 0.000
In the last year, have you written down your
Passwords(M)/PINs(A)?
n=313 ; Chi-Sq = 380.8; P-Value = 0.000
In the last year, have you shared a
Password(M)/PIN(A) with friends, family, coworkers, or others?
n=723;n*=2;Chi-Sq=381.9;P-Value = 0.000
In the last year, have you shared
(CAC+PIN)/Password with friends, family,
co-workers, or others?
n=723;n*=2;Chi-Sq=450.2;P-Value = 0.000
How many Passwords(M)/PINs(A) are you
currently using?
n=722;n*=3;Chi-Sq=162.5;P-Value = 0.000

Chi-Sq Analysis
Hist(n)
Hist(%) E(n)
232
68.6
214.8

Cat.
Yes

O(n)
78

Chi-Sq
87.2

No
DK
Yes
No
DK
Yes
No

233
2
1
294
18
80
233

102
4
18
235
85
325
12

30.2
1.2
5.3
69.5
25.1
96.4
3.6

94.5
3.7
16.7
217.6
78.7
301.9
11.1

203.2
0.8
14.7
26.8
46.8
163.06
4416.12

Yes
No

67
246

241
97

71.3
28.7

223.2
89.8

109.3
271.5

Yes

26

132

39.1

282.4

232.7

No

697

206

60.9

440.6

149.1

Yes

4

132

39.1

282.4

274.4

No

719

206

60.9

440.6

175.8

0-4
5:10
10+

294
307
121

67
171
76

21.3
54.5
24.2

154.1
393.2
174.8

127.1
18.9
16.5

Cat. = Category/Response to question
O(n) = Observed (Alsop’s Results)
Hist = Historical (Martinson's Results)
E(n) = Expected in O(n) based on Hist (%)
DK = Don't Know

In response to the question, “Do you use the same PIN/Password for multiple
applications?” The hypotheses are:
•
•

Ho: Reuse of PIN(s) and Password(s) are the same
Ha: Reuse of PIN(s) and Password(s) different

The proportion of users answering ‘Yes’ to this question dropped from 96.2
percent to 25.6 percent (Table 3). It appears that users are much less likely to reuse a PIN
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as they are to reuse a password. This trend enhances the security of the network by
reducing the vulnerability of a user’s PIN being compromised through a successful attack
on a different network or system. Utilizing the chi-square analysis (Table 4), we get a
chi-square of 4579.2 and a p-value of 0.000. We must reject the null hypothesis and
conclude that the proportion of users that reuse PIN(s) and the proportion of users that
reuse password(s) are different.
In response to the question, “In the last year, have you written down your
PIN(s)/Password(s)?” The hypotheses are:
•
•

Ho: The proportion of users writing down their PIN is the same as the
proportion of users writing down their password
Ha: The proportion of users writing down their PIN is different than the
proportion of users writing down their password

The proportion of users answering ‘Yes’ to this question dropped from 71.3
percent to 21.4 percent (Table 3). It appears that users are much less inclined to write
down a PIN, as they are to write down a password. This enhances the security of the
network by reducing the vulnerability of a user’s PIN being compromised through
observation or inadvertent discovery. Utilizing the chi-square analysis (Table 4), we get
a chi-square of 380.8 and a p-value of 0.000. We must reject the null hypothesis and
conclude that the proportion of users writing down their PIN(s) is different from the
proportion of users writing down their password.
In response to the question, “In the last year, have you shared a PIN/Password
with friends, family, co-workers, or others?” The hypotheses are:
•
•

Ho: The proportion of users sharing their PIN is the same as the proportion
of users sharing their password
Ha: The proportion of users sharing their PIN is different than the
proportion of users sharing their password
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The proportion of users answering ‘Yes’ to this question dropped from 39.1
percent to 3.6 percent (Table 3). It appears that users are much less inclined to share their
PIN as they were in sharing their password. This could be related to the fact that in order
for a user’s PIN to be useful, they would also have to share their CAC, leaving the user
without the ability to access the base and base services. Utilizing the chi-square analysis
(Table 4), we get a chi-square of 381.9 and a p-value of 0.000. We must reject the null
hypothesis and conclude that the proportion of users sharing their PIN is significantly
different from the proportion of users sharing their password. Since a user would also
have to lend out their CAC with their PIN in order to grant someone unauthorized access
to Air Force networks, we also performed this analysis for users that shared their CAC
and their PIN. In this instance, only four respondents stated that they had shared their
CAC and their PIN. Utilizing the chi-square analysis based on this data (Table 4), we get
a chi-square of 450.2 and a p-value of 0.000 on the hypothesis that users are likely to
share their network account independent of the authentication technique used. In this
case, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the likelihood of users sharing their
network account is dependent on the authentication technique of the network. In this
case, the CAC and PIN authentication technique is significantly less prone to the account
sharing than the logon ID and password network authentication.
In response to the question, “How many PINs/Passwords are you currently
using?” The hypotheses are:
•
•

Ho: The number of PINs that a user must recall is the same as the number
of passwords that they must recall
Ha: The number of PINs that a user must recall is different from the
number of passwords that they must recall
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The data shows that the number of PINs that respondents say they use is less than
the number of passwords that they were using. We see an increase in the “1-4” category
from 19.8 percent of users to 40.6 percent. This corresponds to the decreases in the “510” category and the “10+” category. With a higher proportion of users having to
remember fewer PINs, users are going to be less inclined to write them down. Utilizing
the chi-square analysis (Table 4), we get a chi-square of 162.5 and a p-value of 0.000.
We must reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the number of PINs that a user must
recall is different from the number of passwords that they must recall.
Research Hypothesis Three
Survey questions 10 and 23-25 of this research pertained specifically to the third
hypothesis, “Individuals will be more likely to adhere to policy guidance under the new
authentication method as compared to password authentication” We will analyze this
hypothesis with a direct comparison of the survey results between Martinson’s research
and ours (Table 5). For questions 10 and 23-25, the independent variable (e.g. the
authentication technique) is nominal (or categorical) as are the dependent variables (see
Table 5). We will use a Chi-Square Goodness-of-Fit test to analyze each of the related
questions and whether or not the results are significant around α = .05.
In response to the question, “Do you feel that the CAC and PIN network
authentication procedures and parameters are a nuisance?” The hypotheses are:
•
•

Ho: The proportion of users that consider network authentication a
nuisance is independent of the authentication technique
Ha: The proportion of users that consider network authentication a
nuisance is dependent on the authentication technique
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The proportion of users answering ‘Yes’ to this question dropped from 62.1
percent to 34.2 percent (Table 5). Before analyzing the data using the Chi-Square
Goodness-of-fit test, we realized there was a distinct different between the answers “No
Opinion” and “Don’t Know.” When Martinson asked this question, the possible answers
were “Yes”, “No”, and “Don’t Know”. When we asked this question, our possible
answers were “Yes”, “No”, and “No Opinion”. Because of the contextual difference of
these answers, we decided to treat all answers in categories of “Don’t Know” for
Martinson’s research and “No Opinion” for our research as null responses and did not use
them to compute the Chi-Square. Utilizing the chi-square analysis (Table 6), we get a
chi-square of 187.5 and a p-value of 0.000. We must reject the null hypothesis and
conclude that the proportion of users that consider the new CAC and PIN authentication
method a nuisance is significantly less than the proportion of users that considered
password based network authentication parameters and procedures a nuisance.
In response to the question, “Do you feel the PIN policies (creation and use) are
burdensome?” The hypotheses are:
•
•

Ho: The proportion of users that consider PIN policies a burden is the
same as the proportion of users that consider password policies a burden
Ha: The proportion of users that consider PIN policies a burden is different
then the proportion of users that consider password policies a burden

The proportion of users answering ‘Yes’ to this question dropped from 50.9
percent to 32.3 percent (Table 5). Before analyzing the data using the Chi-Square
Goodness-of-fit test, we realized there was a distinct different between the answers “No
Opinion” and “Don’t Know.” When Martinson asked this question, the possible answers
were “Yes”, “No”, and “Don’t Know”. When we asked this question, our possible
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answers were “Yes”, “No”, and “No Opinion”. Because of the contextual difference of
these answers, we decided to treat all answers in categories of “Don’t Know” for
Martinson’s research and “No Opinion” for our research as null responses and did not use
them to compute the Chi-Square. Utilizing the chi-square analysis (Table 6), we get a
chi-square of 88.4 and a p-value of 0.000. We must reject the null hypothesis and
conclude that the proportion of users that consider PIN policies a burden is significantly
less than the proportion of users that consider password policies a burden.
Table 5 - Research Hypothesis 3 Raw Data Analysis
Question Asked

Question

(M - Martinson; A - Alsop)

Number

Yes

No

NO/DK

*

Do you feel that the Password(M)/CAC & PIN(A)
procedures & parameters are a nuisance?

M-Q10

62.1

36.7

0.9

0.3

A-Q10

34.2

57.7

7.6

0.6

Do you feel the Password(M)/PIN(A) policies are
burdensome?

M-Q14

50.9

44.4

3.3

1.5

A-Q24

32.3

57.2

10.2

0.3

Yes

No

Some

Unsure

*

Do you follow the Password(M)/CAC & PIN(A)
procedures based on organizational guidance?

M-Q13

84

4.4

8.9

2.1

0.5

A-Q25

81.8

2.2

4.1

11.4

0.4

O

G

A

NI

P

N/A
*

M-Q12

7.7

31.7

45

8.6

5

2.1

A-Q23

7.9

30.5

44.4

10.2

6.5

0.6

How would you characterize your organization's
training and education relating to the creation of
Passwords(M)/PINs and the use of the CAC card for
network authentication(A)?

Response

NO - No Opinion; DK - Don't Know; * - No Response
O - Outstanding; G - Good; A - Adequate; NI - Needs Improvement; P - Poor

In response to the question, “Do you follow CAC/PIN procedures based on
organizational guidance?” The hypotheses are:
•
•

Ho: The proportion of users that follow CAC/PIN procedures based on
organizational guidance is the same as the proportion of users that follow
password procedures based on organizational guidance
Ha: The proportion of users that follow CAC/PIN procedures based on
organizational guidance is different from the proportion of users that
follow password procedures based on organizational guidance
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Table 6 - Research Hypothesis 3 Chi-Sq Analysis
Question Asked (M - Martinson; A - Alsop)

Chi-Sq Analysis

Question/Chi-Sq Analysis

Cat.

O(n)

Hist

Hist %

E(n)

Chi-Sq

Do you feel that the Password(M)/CAC & PIN(A) procedures &
parameters are a nuisance?

Yes

248

210

62.3

449.3

117.90

No

418

124

36.8

265.3

69.60

n=666 ; n*=59; Chi-Sq=187.5 ; P-Value = 0.000

DK

Do you feel the Password(M)/PIN(A) policies are
burdensome?

Yes

234

172

53.4

346.7

36.62

No

415

150

46.6

302.3

41.99

n=649 ; n*=76 ; Chi-Sq = 88.4 ; P-Value = 0.000

DK

Yes

593

284

84.5

610.3

0.49

No

16

15

4.5

32.2

8.18

Some

30

30

8.9

64.5

18.43

NS/DK

83

7

2.1

15.0

307.04

O

57

26

7.9

56.6

0.00

G

221

107

32.3

233.1

0.63

A

322

152

45.9

331.1

0.25

NI

74

29

8.8

63.2

1.86

P

47

17

5.1

37.0

2.68

Do you follow the Password(M)/CAC & PIN(A) procedures
based on organizational guidance?
n=722 ; n*=3 ; Chi-Sq = 334.124 ; P-Value = 0.000

How would you characterize your organization's training and
education relating to the creation of Passwords(M)/PINs and
the use of the CAC card for network authentication(A)?
n=721;n*=4;Chi-Sq = 5.42; P-Value = 0.247

Cat. = Category/Response to question; O(n) = Observed (Alsop's Results); Hist = Historical (Martinson's Results)
E(n) = Expected in O(n) based on Hist (%); DK = Don't Know
O - Outstanding; G - Good; A - Adequate; NI - Needs Improvement; P - Poor

The proportion of users answering ‘Yes’ to this question dropped from 84 percent
to 81.8 percent (Table 5), those answering “No” dropped from 4.4 percent to 2.2 percent,
and those answering “Sometimes” dropped from 8.9 percent to 4.1 percent. The most
significant change was the increase in the number of users that are unsure about whether
they are following their organization’s guidance. Those answering “Don’t Know” or
“Not Sure” increased from 2.1 percent to 11.4 percent. This change contributed the most
to the chi-square score. Utilizing the chi-square analysis (Table 6), we get a chi-square of
334.1 and a p-value of 0.000. We must reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the

81

proportion of users that follow CAC/PIN procedures based on organizational guidance is
significantly different from the proportion of users that follow password procedures
based on organizational guidance.
In response to the question, “How would you characterize your organization's
training and education relating to the creation of PINs and the use of the CAC card for
network authentication?” The hypotheses are:
•
•

Ho: Organizational training and education relating to the creation of PINs
and the use of the CAC is the same as organizational training and
education relating to the creation of passwords.
Ha: Organizational training and education relating to the creation of PINs
and the use of the CAC is different from organizational training and
education relating to the creation of passwords.

In analyzing the results (Table 5), it appears that there is little difference in the
organizational training and education between the creation of passwords and the creation
and use of PINs and CACs. Utilizing the chi-square analysis (Table 6), we get a chisquare of 5.42 and a p-value of 0.247. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that
organizational training and education relating to the creation of PINs and the use of the
CAC is the same as organizational training and education relating to the creation of
passwords.
Research Hypothesis Four
Survey questions 12-15, and 17-20 of this research pertained specifically to the
fourth hypothesis, “The new authentication technique will contribute to a loss in worker
productivity and smart cards.” We analyzed this hypothesis by evaluating the
respondent’s answers to two questions. One that pertained specifically to the issue of
users leaving their CAC behind in a card reader and another question that determined
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CAC loss or theft attributed to the new authentication technique. While we have no data
about previous CAC loss or theft prior to the implementation of the mandatory CAC and
PIN authentication method, we do know that there were few requirements in which users
had to take their CAC out of their wallet or purse except for identification. We used the
number of CACs that were identified as lost and or stolen that were not attributed to the
new CAC and PIN authentication system as a baseline in order to determine the relative
increase in lost or stolen CACs as a result of the new authentication technique.

Figure 42 - CAC in reader vs. CAC left behind

An interesting side note is that whether the user is required to leave their CAC in
the card reader while on the network appeared to have no effect on whether they left their
CAC behind in the computer or not (Figure 42). Based on the results of this chi-square
analysis, whether the user has to leave their CAC in the card reader in order maintain
access to the network will have little impact on whether the user forgets to take their
CAC with them when they leave.
To predict the number of CACs left behind based on a population of 491,786
military and civilian members (AFPC 2006), we used regression analysis to determine a
95 percent prediction interval and a fitted value. This regression model gave us 841,539
+/- 43,149 CACs left behind during a six month period (figure 43).
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Table 7 - Research Hypothesis 4 Raw Data Analysis
Question
Number

n

Yes

No

Response
Some

*

With the new CAC/PIN authentication, do you
have to leave your CAC in the card reader while
accessing the network?

A-Q12

725

86.1

6.9

6.8

0.3

In the last 6 month, have you inadvertently left
your CAC behind in the computer?

A-Q13

725

66.8

33

n/a

0

1

2

3

4

5+

*

21.9

31

20

7.6

19

0.6

G

M

S

NAA

*

69.4

10

9.1

11.2

0.2

Yes

No

*

6.1

94

0

1

2

3

4

5+

*

77.3

14

4.5

0

2.3

2.3

G

M

S

NAA

*

27.3

11

2.3

56.8

2.3

Question Asked

In the last 6 months, how many times have you
left your CAC at work, in the computer?
How much did the new CAC/PIN authentication
technique contribute to this?

Since implementation of the CAC and PIN to
authenticate on the network, has your CAC been
lost, stolen, or misplaced?

How many times has your CAC been lost, stolen,
or misplaced?

How much did the new CAC/PIN authentication
technique contribute to loss, theft, or
misplacement?

A-Q14

A-Q15

A-Q17

A-Q18

A-Q19

484

484

725

44

44

* = No Response/Null; G = Greatly; M = Moderately; S = Slightly; NAA = Not At All; A - Alsop Survey

Figure 43 - CACs Left Behind for Air Force Active Duty Mil/Civ
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Using the fitted value of 841,539 instances in which users left their CAC behind,
unsecured at a computer workstation during a six-month period, we extrapolated the
value for a one-year period to be 1,683,078. Building on that number to determine how
much productive time was lost from the mission gives us the following equation:
CACs left behind in 1 year
Q16:User having problems accessing base
Lost work time (user and helper) per incident in minutes
Total lost work time per year (in minutes)
Total lost work time convert to work years

x
x

1,683,078.00
62.03%
30
31,320,398.50
261.00

Figure 44 - Time lost in one year due to CAC leave behinds

Here we have incorporated the results of question 16, “When you left your CAC
at work, did it cause you problems in accessing the base or base services?” Additionally,
we determined the lost time per incident, 30 minutes total. We assume a loss of 15
minutes for the person attempting to access the base, and 15 minutes for the co-worker
that has to go to the base entrance to either return their CAC or sign them onto the base.
The results show that we lose the equivalent of 261 work years, per year, to grant
individuals access to the base due to the new CAC and PIN authentication technique. If
the average salary for personnel were 40,000 dollars a year, this would equate to 10.44
million payroll dollars a year spent on individuals to wait at the gate and signing people
onto the base.
Additionally, there were several incidents where the CAC was lost or stolen due
to this new authentication technique. The results of question 19, “How much did the new
CAC/PIN authentication technique contribute to loss, theft, or misplacement?”, showed
that 40.91 percent of the CACs that were lost or stolen in the last 6 months were the
result of the new CAC and PIN authentication technique. Using the number of CACs
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that were lost or stolen and were not attributed to the new authentication technique (58
percent) as the baseline, shows us an increase of 72 percent. To predict the number of
CACs lost or stolen based on a population of 491,786 military and civilian members
(AFPC 2006), we used regression analysis to determine a 95 percent prediction interval
and a fitted value. The regression model (figure 45) gives us 14,111 +/- 2,132 CACs that
were lost or stolen in the last 6 months due specifically to the new CAC and PIN
authentication technique.

Figure 45 - CAC lost or stolen in last 6 months

This also incurs a cost in regards to time lost from accomplishing the mission.
Using the fitted value of 14,111 instances in which users had their CAC lost or stolen
during a six-month period, we extrapolated the value for a one-year period to be 28,222.
Building on that number to determine how much productive time was lost from the
mission gives us the following equation (Figure 46):
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CACs stolen/lost due to CAC/PIN in 1 year
Lost work time per incident in minutes
Total lost work time per year (in minutes)
Total lost work time convert to work years

x

28,222.00
60
1,693,320.00
14.11

Figure 46- Time lost in one year due to CAC loss/theft

For lost time per incident, we have assumed a value of 60 minutes total for an
individual to go to the military personnel flight and replace their CAC. This is a
generous estimate as it assumes that the individual does not have to wait, nor does it
include the time that the personnel specialist has to spend creating the new card. The
results show that we lose the equivalent of 14.11 work years, per year, to replace lost or
stolen CACs due to the new CAC and PIN authentication technique. If the average salary
for personnel were 40,000 dollars a year, this would equate to 564,400 payroll dollars a
year spent on individuals just to replace their CAC card because theirs was lost or stolen
due to the new authentication technique.
Research Hypothesis Five
Survey questions 21, 22, and 26 of this research pertained specifically to the fifth
hypothesis, “Accessibility of the networks will decline as individuals find it more
difficult to perform job tasks away from the primary workplace (i.e. TDY, Leave) due to
the requirement of having a token to authenticate.” In Table 8 and Figure 47, you can see
that users that must use a CAC reader to access their email accounts from remote
locations find the ease of remote access more difficult than those who are not required to
use a CAC reader. In Table 8, we broke out the responses for questions 22 and 26 from
those individuals that must use a CAC reader remotely. To analyze the significance of
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the difference, we utilized the Kruskal-Wallis H-Test for question 22 and the Chi-Square
Goodness of Fit test for question 26.
Table 8 -Research Hypothesis 5 Raw Data Analysis
Question Asked

Question

To access your work email account remotely (e.g. Home,
TDY, In Transit), do you have to use a CAC reader?

Response

Number

n

Yes

No

DK

*

Q21

725

42.9

28.6

27.9

0.7

VD

SD

NC

LE

ME

*

Since implementation of the CAC/PIN authentication, how
would you rate the ease of accessing the network remotely
(All responses)

Q22

725

40.3

17.1

23.2

7.2

7

5.2

Since implementation of the CAC/PIN authentication, how
would you rate the ease of accessing the network remotely
(CAC required for remote access)

Q22

311

58.2

19.3

12.5

5.5

3.5

1

Since implementation of the CAC/PIN authentication, how
would you rate the ease of accessing the network remotely
(CAC not required for remote access)

Q22

207

33.8

16.4

29.5

8.7

9.2

2.4

Yes

No

Some

*

37.1

42.8

19.7

0.4

Do you feel that using the CAC and PIN authentication
method is burdensome? (All Responses)

Q26

725

Do you feel that using the CAC and PIN authentication
Q26
22.2
311 44.1 33.4
method is burdensome? (CAC required for remote access)
Do you feel that using the CAC and PIN authentication
Q26
18.4
method is burdensome? (CAC not required for remote
207 34.3 46.9
access)
VD = Very Difficult; SD = Slightly More Difficult; NC = No Change; LE = Little Easier; ME = Much Easier

Ease of accessing the network remotely vs. CAC required for remote access
1

2

3

1

4

5

*

2

58.1994

60
45

33.8164

Percent

19.2926

29.4686

30

16.4251

12.5402
5.46624 3.53698

8.69565 9.17874
0.96463

3

*

15
2.41546

60
45
30

33.6634
19.802

15
0

22.2222
14.8515

8.41584 9.40594

13.8614 11.1111
0

1

2

3

4

5

0

0

66.6667

0

Ease_of_Access
Very Difficult
Slightly Difficult
No Change
A Little Easier
Much Easier
No Response

*

Ease of Accessing the Network Remotely
Panel variables: '1' - CAC Required; '2' - CAC Not Required; '3' - Don't Know; * - No Response

Figure 47 – Ease of Remote Email Access
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0.3
0.5

For the question, “Since implementation of the CAC/PIN authentication, how
would you rate the ease of accessing the network remotely?” the hypotheses for KruskalWallis H-test are:
•
•

Ho: The population probability distributions between users that have to use
a CAC remotely, those who do not, and those who don’t know, is identical
Ha: At least two of the 3 probability distributions are different

Figure 48 - Kruskal-Wallis Test of “Ease of Use” vs. CAC Required

By looking at the median answer for question 22, “Since implementation of the
CAC/PIN authentication, how would you rate the ease of accessing the network
remotely?” in regards to each response for question 21, “To access you work email
account remotely, do you have to use a CAC reader?” We see that those who answered
‘Yes’ to having a CAC required for remote access had a median answer of ‘Very
Difficult’ regarding the ease of accessing the network remotely. This contrasts with those
who do not need their CAC for remote access, who had a median answer of “Slightly
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More Difficult”. The H-statistic for this analysis is 77.41 and the p-value is 0.000. We
must reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the two of the three probability
distributions are different. In this case, it is apparent that users that can only access the
email remotely via the use of a CAC reader find this new authentication technique to be
significantly more difficult than those who do not have to use the CAC reader.
In response to the question, “Do you feel that using the CAC and PIN
authentication method is burdensome?” I wanted to analyze the results based on the
respondents answer to question 21, “To access you work email account remotely, do you
have to use a CAC reader?” The hypotheses for this test are:
•
•

Ho: The burden felt by the users from the CAC and PIN authentication
method is independent of whether they need a CAC reader to access their
email remotely
Ha: The burden felt by the users from the CAC and PIN authentication
method is dependent of whether they need a CAC reader to access their
email remotely

It appears from the data in figure 49, that there is a trend in which users that
require a CAC to access their email account remotely (Figure 49: Panel 1), consider the
new CAC and PIN authentication method more burdensome than users that do not
require a CAC. This is consistent with our analysis of question 22 (Figure 47). Utilizing
the chi-square analysis (Figure 50), we get a chi-square of 23 and a p-value of 0.000.
With the α = .05, we must reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the burden felt by
the users from the CAC and PIN authentication method is dependent of whether they
need a CAC reader to access their email remotely.
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Is CAC and PIN authentication burdensome vs. CAC Required for Remote Access
1

2

1

3

60

46.8599

44.0514

45

34.2995

33.4405

30

22.1865

Percent

*

2

18.3575

15
0.483092

0.321543

3

60

*
44.4444

45
30
15
0

55.5556

51.9802

30.198
17.8218
0

0

0
C A C /PIN
Burdensome
Yes
No
Sometimes
No Response

0

1
2
3
*
Do you feel that using the CAC and PIN authentication method is burdensome?

Panel variables: '1' - CAC Required; '2' - CAC Not Required; '3' - Don't Know; * - No Response

Figure 49 - CAC / PIN burden due to remote access ability

Figure 50 - Chi-Square Analysis Q26 vs. Q21
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Chapter Overview
In this chapter, we analyzed the data collected and compared applicable questions
directly to the results of Martinson’s research. We reviewed the responses for each
survey question in detail and then we analyzed each of the research hypotheses, directly
comparing our results against the results of Martinson’s research, where appropriate, with
statistical analysis tests.
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V. Discussion, Conclusions and Recommendations
In this chapter, we discuss our conclusions, recommendations, and suggestions for
future research. I will step through each of the research hypotheses and the respective
data analysis that supports them to draw their overarching conclusion.

Conclusions
In chapter one, I proposed five hypotheses for this research. The first two were:
1) The implementation of a two-factor authentication technique will increase
the effectiveness of network authentication as related to human factors.
2) The vulnerabilities that affect a strictly password based authentication
method will not have an effect on the PIN portion of a two-factor
authentication method?
In analyzing the data related to the first and second hypotheses, we had (Table 3;
Table 4) the following key findings:
•
•
•
•
•
•

(RH 1/2) Users were less likely to change their PIN to familiar pattern
(RH 1) The PIN has not been compromised as often as the password
(RH 1/2) Users do not recycle their PIN as often as they recycle passwords
(RH 1/2) Users do not write down their PIN as often as they write down
passwords
(RH 1/2) Users do not share their CAC or their PIN nearly as often was
the case for passwords in the password based authentication method
(Martinson 2005)
(RH 1/2) The number of PINs that users must recall is less than the
number of passwords that users had to recall

Based on these results, we conclude that the vulnerabilities that affect the
password based authentication systems (sharing, recycling, recall burden, and writing
them down) are significantly reduced in the PIN portion. In addition, the complexity of a
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PIN is significantly less than that for a password. A PIN is typically composed of a series
of six to eight numbers (i.e. ten character set vs. a passwords 96 character set) and does
not have to be changed at regular intervals. Due to the reduced vulnerabilities identified
in the data supporting the second hypothesis, the reduced complexity of PINs, and the
observation that PINs have not been compromised as often as passwords, we conclude
that the two-factor authentication technique implemented by the DoD will increase the
effectiveness of network authentication as it relates to human factors.
The third hypothesis in this study was:
3) Individuals will be more likely to adhere to policy guidance under the new
authentication method as compared to password authentication
In analyzing the data related to this hypothesis, we had (Table 5; Table 6) the
following key findings:
•
•
•

•

The CAC and PIN authentication technique is less of a nuisance than the
logon ID and password technique
PIN (creation and use) policies are less burdensome than the password
parameters of the logon ID and password technique
While the number of users that follow CAC and PIN procedures is
consistent with the number of users that followed password procedures,
the number of users that are unsure about whether they follow
organizational guidance has increased significantly.
Training and education for the CAC and PIN authentication method is
similar to that of the logon ID and password authentication technique.

Based on these results, we conclude that the two-factor authentication technique
implemented by the DoD will increase user adherence to policy guidance based on the
construct that if users believe the technique to be less of a ‘nuisance’ or ‘burden’, then
they will be less likely to develop a technique that circumvents policy and guidance.
There is some concern about the number of users that are unsure about whether they are
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following policy. This could be because the CAC and PIN authentication method has
only been mandatory for the sample population for approximately six months when the
survey had been given. In contrast, the logon ID and password authentication technique
had been in place for many years when Martinson did his research.
The fourth hypothesis in this study was:
4) The new authentication technique will contribute to a loss in worker
productivity and smart cards.
In analyzing the data related to this hypothesis, we had (Table 7; Figures 42-46)
the following key findings:
•
•

•

67 percent of users left their CAC behind in the reader in the last 6 months
• Approximately 841,539 unattended CACs in the last 6 months
• 261 work-years per year in lost productivity (approx $10.4M)
6 percent of users had their CAC lost or stolen in the last 6 months
• 41 percent of users attributed theft/loss to new CAC authentication
i. 72 percent increase in lost/stolen CACs
ii. 28,222 more CACs lost or stolen each year
iii. 14.11 work-years per year in lost productivity ($564K)
Requiring the CAC to be in the card reader to maintain network access to
has little impact on whether the user leaves their CAC behind

Based on these results, we concluded that the use of a CAC and PIN
authentication technique as implemented by the DoD has contributed to a loss in worker
productivity and an increase in the loss or theft of CACs due to the increased insecure
handling of the CAC.
The fifth hypothesis in this study was:
5) Accessibility of the networks will decline as individuals find it more
difficult to perform job tasks away from the primary workplace (i.e. TDY,
Leave) due to the requirement of having a token to authenticate.
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In analyzing the data related to this hypothesis, we had (Table 8; Figures 47-50)
the following key findings:
•

Users that are required to use the CAC in order to access their email
remotely find it significantly more difficult and burdensome than those
who are not required to use the CAC

Based on these results, in addition to the results of question 27, where 35.5
percent of respondents stated that accessing email remotely is more difficult, we conclude
that the network accessibility while away from their primary workplace has declined
significantly due to the increased level of difficulty of getting access. This was also a
topic of concern in the comment sections of questions 27, 34, and 36. Most users find
that the inability to access their email from locations other than their primary workplace
significantly hampers their ability to do their job and be responsive. After closing the
survey, I was still getting emails from users that wanted to participate. As an example,
one of these requests was from the officer in charge (OIC) of a reserve unit that stated,
“The introduction of the CAC card for home use has decimated the communications
channels that our reserve unit has spent years developing. We are now looking at going
back to paper bulletins with stamps.” This was their primary method of disseminating
information and maintaining recall information for all the reservists in the unit. Due to
the loss of ubiquitous remote email access capability, due to the requirement for a CAC,
their normal communication capabilities were severely hampered.
Additional Findings
Based on user responses, we found that leaving behind the CAC contributes to
more than just the physical security threat of lost or stolen CACs, it also has
consequences in regards to lost productivity. The number of CACs that were left behind
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also had an effect on respondent’s ability to access the base or base services. We found
this contributed to a loss of 261 work years, per year, in lost productivity. This figure
does not include the additional 14 years of lost productivity in cases where users had to
take time out of work to replace their CAC. Combined these losses contribute to a total
of 11 million payroll dollars spent on individuals going to and from the gate and waiting
at the personnel flight.
Another finding of this research was an apparent interest, and in some cases a
plea, for a move towards an authentication system that utilizes the fingerprint, a
biometric, as opposed to the logon ID and password and the CAC and PIN techniques.
This was clear by the response to question 32 and the comments on questions 35 and 36.
Most of the reasoning behind this trend is the hope to reduce the number of times that
people are unable to do their job or access the base because they left their CAC at home
or they left their CAC at work, in the computer. If they left their CAC at home, they
found that they could not access the base network unless they returned home to retrieve
it. If they left their CAC at work, they had to have someone (i.e. coworker) come to the
gate to either bring them their CAC or grant them access to the base. By moving to an
authentication system that relies on who the person “is”, a biometric, rather than what
they “have”, you eliminate any issues regarding network access when they do not “have”
the required item.
The new CAC and PIN authentication technique is also causing concerns in
regards to personal information. Respondents were concerned about leaving their CACs
unattended during short errands around the office. The slow logon times due to CAC
certificate validation is apparently contributing to this trend as users find it inherently
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frustrating waiting to log back on, so instead they just leave their CAC in the reader. In
other instances, due to fast-paced work environments, they just forget to take their CAC
with them on short errands. The fact that their name, Social Security Number, and date
of birth are easily accessible on the CAC poses privacy concerns, especially with the
increase in identity theft in recent years. While the majority of individuals that have
access to military bases and facilities have some type of clearance, there are exceptions,
such as contracted cleaning and maintenance staff. Additionally, while any compromised
CACs are unlikely to allow an unauthorized user access to the DoD networks, they could
potentially be used to gain access to the base by unauthorized personnel.
Another issue that is causing concerns is the apparent inconsistencies of applying
a common standard for accessing email remotely under the new CAC and PIN
authentication technique. Some users responded that their bases had not implemented
any remote email access capability, regardless of whether they had a CAC reader. Other
locations have implemented remote access with a CAC reader, but have not issued users
CAC readers, thus putting the onus on the user to buy a reader so that they can be more
productive for the USAF. In contrast, other users, 29 percent of respondents, stated that
they had access to their email remotely just using a logon ID and password. One thing is
clear; denying users the ability to access to their email accounts remotely has caused a
significant amount of frustration and reduced their ability to respond promptly.
Another issue addressed by more than a few respondents was the inability of the
CAC and PIN authentication system to serve unique operational requirements. While
most users on the network sit in one location and work on one computer. Many
situations require users to operate multiple workstations at once. As such, requiring users
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to logon with their CAC causes significant usability hardships. Another unique
environment issue involved local foreign nationals. Apparently issuing these users a
CAC in order for them to do their job runs into problems when trying to get host nation
approval to issue a CAC for their citizens. Apparently, according to the responses, some
host nations have reservations with the data (e.g. privacy act, biometric) that is needed for
the CAC validation and issuance.
Recommendations
While the CAC and PIN authentication method has increased the effectiveness of
network authentication and user’s adherence to policy guidance, the implementation of
the technique has also caused serious problems in regards to usability, productivity, and
CAC loss.
The usability of the system in regards to accessibility to work email accounts,
especially from remote locations such as home or while TDY has encountered serious
setbacks. Implementing CAC remote access and issuing card readers for remote use to
those that need it, perhaps through a virtual private connection, could maintain the same
level of security while allowing the users more flexibility in using the system to
accomplish the mission. Additionally, allowing users located temporarily, TDY or
deployed, at other federal installations, should be able to access their home base domain,
if at least, just for email purposes. The remote locations typically are equipped with
computer and card reader necessary for certificate validation. We should be able to allow
Microsoft Outlook Web Access (OWA) via CAC and PIN authorization at these
locations. Accessing these remote computers that are not part of our normal domain
should be as easy as validating the certificate on our CAC and granting the user “Guest”

99

access. We could even load the CAC with the date of our last information assurance
training.
A simple way to resolve several other burdens placed upon users would be to
allow all users to logon to a computer using their CAC via RFID. This is analogous to
showing our CAC at the gate to gain access. We take the CAC out (perhaps on a
lanyard), logon to the network, and then return the CAC to where it came from. We
never have to place the card into the computer and wait. This way we maintain increased
authentication security to the network in addition to allowing the user to keep their
primary form of identification secure and on their person. The will eliminate the problem
of cards left behind in the card reader and the associated burdens thrust on the user due to
forgetfulness, such as the embarrassing call to a coworker to come to the gate and
“escort” them onto the base. It would also reduce the amount of wear and tear caused by
card readers and subsequent replacement that the CAC is currently subjected too.
Additionally, this would allow users, such as network technicians, to logon to more than
one computer at a time without having to resort to methods that would circumvent
security (i.e. have an exception to CAC and PIN authentication such as a logon ID and
password).
Until we allow everyone to move away from leaving the CAC in the reader while
logged on scenario, respondents suggested several ways to reduce the problems
associated with leaving the CAC behind. They suggestions are; using keyboards with
attached CAC readers, having computers emit a warning during logout if the CAC is still
in the reader, and posting signs by all the exits reminding users to remember to take their
CAC with them before they leave.
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Another possibility would be to transition our authentication technique to a
biometric based system. This would serve the same purpose and garner the same benefits
as a CAC logon scheme that utilized RFID. Additional benefits would come from
untangling network access to a token that we constantly have to carry with us, and serves
as a roadblock to access if we lose it. Of course, if we did not provide fingerprint readers
for remote access, we would still have the same problems with usability. Perhaps issuing
the fingerprint reader, via hand receipt, similar to the way we issue laptops, would allow
users to access to their accounts from those remote sites. What would the cost of this
endeavor be? Looking online, I found that smart card readers and fingerprint readers to
be approximately the same costs, 40 dollars. In order to provide a universal serial bus
(USB) fingerprint reader, at a cost of approximately 40 dollars each, to 491,786 military
and civilian members of the USAF, the cost would be about 20 million dollars.
Compared to the approximately 10.4 million dollars a year in lost productivity, this could
be recouped in two years. Of course, I am comparing apples and oranges here. Payroll
dollars are going to be paid whether we implement this technology or not, whereas the
money for fingerprint readers will have to come from a budget somewhere. But in light
of the recent force shaping initiatives, we should be looking at ways to eliminate as much
wasted productive time as possible. Additionally, wouldn’t it be a good idea to eliminate
the increased vulnerability to our primary form of identification sooner rather than later.
Just standardizing email access via the CAC and PIN through a virtual private
connection, and issuing CAC readers, would solve many problems in regards to allowing
people remote access to their accounts. The results of the survey show this to be one of
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the biggest frustrations that users have with the CAC and PIN authentication method. It
seems that we have regressed 10 years in our communications ability in this regard.
Suggestions for Further Study
This study addressed the changes in authentication security measures when
moving from a logon ID and password based system to a CAC and PIN based mechanism
as they relate to usage and policy. Additionally, this research has shown some of the
usability issues that occur when moving from a purely knowledge based authentication
method to one that requires additional hardware (i.e. card reader and CAC). Before
implementing further changes in the authentication procedures, studies should be done in
order to determine their affects on all users of the system. Considerations that do not
address unique requirements tend to leave some users with fewer capabilities than
previously attained. This loss could affect productivity and in some cases, severely
hamper the business processes.
Additionally, because this survey was taken only six months after mandatory
implementation of the CAC and PIN authentication method, we cannot be certain it
reflects the steady state. A possible future study could administer this survey again to
determine if the results are different after the “growing pains’ of implementation are
worked out.
Another potential topic could look at the incorporation of additional
authentication measures. Technologies that are already included in the CAC are
contactless interfaces (RFID) and biometric data (i.e. fingerprint). The fingerprint data
stored on CACs is already being used to authenticate the user during CAC replacement.
An analysis on whether moving to a three-factor based authentication system, to include a
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discussion on implementing remote access on such a system, would address the perceived
increased security while also ensuring that such an implementation would reduce the
negative effects on productivity and network access. Future research could also look at
how the lack of remote access via the CAC and PIN authentication technique has affected
productivity of users in different job classifications.
Chapter Overview
In this chapter, we reviewed each of the five hypotheses and our findings from the
research. We found that the two-factor authentication technique does increase the level
of security of the network and that users will be more likely to adhere to policy guidance
under the CAC and PIN authentication method as opposed to the logon ID and password
based system. We also showed that The new authentication technique will contribute to a
loss in worker productivity and smart cards as users are made to remove and leave their
CAC unsecured while they are logged on to the network. We also showed that remote
access to critical communications has been severely hampered by the requirement to use
a CAC to authenticate from those remote locations. Finally, we highlighted some
additional issues that were revealed during our research, made recommendations on how
to rectify some of the most pressing problems, and suggested future areas in which to
research.
Last Word
For the DoD, the CAC was supposed to replace all other tools that performed
standard identification, physical access, and logical access to DoD installations and
networks. The implementation of the CAC and PIN authentication method for network
access has increased security, but at the cost of availability of the network and
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productivity of the user. There are plans to incorporate using the CAC for finance,
medical and dental readiness, deployment readiness, and training. Before this is
undertaken, it would be in the best interest of the USAF to analyze exactly ‘how’ the
CAC is going to be used in order to reduce further vulnerabilities to loss, theft, damage,
or misplacement. While having a single tool such as a CAC to access all these systems
and services can make our lives easier, all considerations should be given to ensuring that
users have it secured at all times. Any item with this much power represents a potential
single point of failure and losing or misplacing it can seriously disrupt the capability and
productivity of the owner.
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Appendix A: Definition of Terms and Acronyms
AFCA – Air Force Communications Agency
CAC – Common Access Card (a.k.a. Smart Card)
CAD – Card Accepting Device
CPU – Central Processing Unit
DEPSECDEF – Deputy Secretary of Defense
DMC – Defense Management Council
DoD – Department of Defense
EEPROM – Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
EPROM – Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
FIPS – Federal Information Processing Standards
HSPD – Homeland Security Policy Directive
ICC – Integrated Circuit Card
IRM – Information Resource Management
PIN – Personal Identification Number
PKI – Public Key Infrastructure
PIV – Personal Identification Verification
PC – Personal Computer
ROM – Read Only Memory
RAM – Random Access Memory
TDY – Temporary Duty
USAF – United States Air Force
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Appendix B: Alsop Survey Instrument
The following information is provided as required by the Privacy Act of 1974:
Purpose: To gather information relating to how respondents adhere to policy and
guidance relating to the use of personal identification numbers (PINs) and smart cards.
Routine Use: The results of this study will help to determine whether or not the new
authentication methods being implemented by the Air Force will increase the security of
their network resources.
Analysis of individual responses will be conducted, and only members of the Air Force
Institute of Technology research team (Dr. Strouble, Dr. Hermann, Dr. Heminger and
Maj. A. Scot Alsop) will have access to the raw data.
Participation: Participation is voluntary. No adverse action will be taken against any
member who does not participate in this survey or who does not complete any part of the
survey. All data gathered will be completely confidential and no attempt to identify
respondents will take place. No raw data will be seen by those in your chain of
command.
Instructions
1. Base your answers on your own experiences.
2. Verify you have selected the correct answer before moving on as there is no
ability to go back and change it.
3. Any identifying information gathered will only be used to identify trends within
subsets of the population. It will NOT be used to identify individuals and their
responses.
Contact Information: If you have any questions about this request, please contact Dr.
Dennis Strouble (Primary Investigator) – Phone (937) 785-3355 x3323; Email –
dennis.strouble@afit.edu or Maj. A. Scot Alsop (Graduate Student) – Phone (617) 3087653; Email – aalsop@afit.edu.
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Common Access Card (CAC) and Personal Identification Number (PIN) Usage
Please take a couple of minutes to fill out this short survey. All information will be kept
strictly confidential and will not be seen by chain of command in its raw form. Thank
you for your participation.
1. Do you use a Common Access Card (CAC, aka Military ID) and Personal
Identification Number (PIN) to access the network at work?
a. Yes
b. No
2. Were you issued a PIN, or did you pick your PIN yourself?
a. Issued PIN
b. Picked my own PIN
3. Have you ever changed your PIN so that it is easier to remember?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Don’t Know
4. Has your PIN ever been compromised?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Don’t Know
5. Do you use the same PIN for multiple applications? Example: ATM card, Online
accounts, Credit Cards
a. Yes
b. No
6. In the last year, have you written down your PIN(s)?
a. Yes
b. No
7. In the last year, have you shared a PIN with friends, family, co-workers, or others?
a. Yes
b. No
8. Do you use a familiar date, age, SSN, sequence (i.e. 1234), telephone number, street
address, or pattern to remember your PIN?
a. Yes
b. No
9. What “Technique” do you use? Do NOT write down your PIN.
_______________________________________________________
10. Do you feel that the CAC and PIN network authentication procedures and parameters
are a nuisance?
a. Yes
b. No
c. No Opinion
11. How many PINs (in addition to the one for your CAC) are you currently using?
a. 0-4
b. 3-4
c. 5-6
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d. 7-8
e. 9-10
f. 10+
CAC Usage/Control
12. With the new CAC/PIN authentication, do you have to leave your CAC in the card
reader while accessing the network?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Sometimes
13. In the last 6 months, have you inadvertently left your CAC behind in the computer?
a. Yes
b. No
14. In the last 6 months, how many times have you left your CAC at work, in the
computer? (If NO, you will be automatically skipped to question 17 upon submission)
a. 1
b. 2 times
c. 3 times
d. 4 times
e. 5 or more times
15. In reference to the previous question (# of times you left your CAC at work), how
much did the new CAC/PIN authentication technique contribute to this?
a. Greatly
b. Moderately
c. Slightly
d. Not at all
16. When you left your CAC at work, did it cause you problems in accessing the base or
base services?
a. Yes
b. No
17. Since implementation of the CAC and PIN to authenticate on the network, has your
CAC been lost, stolen, or misplaced? (If NO, you will be automatically skipped to
question 20 upon submission)
a. Yes
b. No
18. In reference to the previous question (17.has your CAC been lost, stolen, etc.), how
many times has your CAC been lost, stolen, or misplaced?
a. Never
b. 1
c. 2
d. 3
e. 4
f. 5+
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19. In reference to the previous question (17. number of times CAC was lost, stolen, etc.),
how much did the new CAC/PIN authentication technique contribute to the loss,
theft, or misplacement?
a. Greatly
b. Moderately
c. Slightly
d. Not at all
20. In the last year, have you let someone (Co-worker, Friend) borrow your CAC?
a. Yes
b. No
21. To access your work email account remotely (e.g. Home, TDY, In Transit), do you
have to use a CAC reader?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Don’t Know
22. Since implementation of the CAC/PIN authentication, how would you rate the ease of
accessing the network remotely?
a. Very Difficult
b. Slightly More Difficult
c. No Change
d. A Little Easier
e. Much Easier
CAC and PIN Guidance
23. How would you characterize your organization’s training and education relating to
the creation of PINs and the use of the CAC card for network authentication?
a. Outstanding
b. Good
c. Adequate
d. Needs Improvement
e. Poor
24. Do you feel the PIN policies (creation and use) are burdensome?
a. Yes
b. No
c. No Opinion
25. Do you follow CAC/PIN procedures based on organizational guidance?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Sometimes
d. Not Sure
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26. Do you feel that using the CAC and PIN authentication method is burdensome?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Sometimes
27. If you think it is burdensome, why? (Select all that apply)
a. I don’t think it is burdensome
b. Have to get CAC from wallet, purse, etc.
c. If I forget or lose my CAC, I can’t access the network to do my job
d. Accessing my email remotely is more difficult
e. Small errands in the office require taking the CAC with me.
f. I’m always forgetting to take the CAC card out of the card reader.
g. Other (If “other” please explain:___________________________________
Additional Feedback
28. Do you believe the previous method of securing network access (logon ID and
Password) was a sufficient means of ensuring network security?
a. Yes
b. No
29. Do you believe that using a CAC to logon to the network is more secure than logon
ID and password?
a. Yes
b. No
30. Do you believe using the CAC to logon to the network is: (choose one):
a. An inconvenience
b. A necessary security evolutionary requirement
31. Do you believe that network access conveniences take priority over security?
a. Yes
b. No
32. If you had a choice of methods to gain access to the network, which would you
prefer?
a. Login ID/Password
b. CAC/PIN
c. Fingerprint
d. Hand Geometry/PIN
e. Iris Scan
f. Other (If “Other”, please explain)_____________________________
g. No Opinion
33. Would you prefer a separate card (similar to CAC, but not for ID) specifically for
network authentication?
a. Yes
b. No
c. No Opinion
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34. What do you think could increase usability/accessibility of the CAC/PIN method
without sacrificing security?
a. _______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
35. What do you think could increase security without sacrificing usability?
a. _______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
36. Please share any additional comments
a. _______________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
Personal Information
(Only AFIT research team will see any of the raw data)
37. What is your age?
a. Under 20
b. 21-30
c. 31-40
d. 41-50
e. 51-60
f. 61+
38. What is your gender
a. Male
b. Female
39. Job or Occupation
a. Military Officer
b. Military Enlisted
c. Civilian
d. Contractor
40. Is your job now or was your job ever in the computer or network security industry?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Don’t Know
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Appendix C: Martinson’s Survey Instrument
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Appendix D: Survey Comment Data

Quest. 8

Question 9

1

#'s I remember due to personal history

1

4-digit PIN I have used often; with added four numbers for variation.

1

A Birthday of someone I know.

1

A combination of a street address (not mine) and another number.

1

a combination of familiar dates and sequence

1

A combination of my birthday.

1

A combination of numbers that I can remember.

1

a combination of parts of old telephone numbers and important dates

1

A combination of some of the items mentioned above.

1

a date

1

A date easy to remember

1

A date for a child's birthday (scrambled).

1

a familiar date
A familiar sequence since I have 15+ passwords to remember (not including PINS/passwords for
personal use)

1
1
1

a friends birthdate.
A jumbled combination of important dates though none of them are my personal info: birthdays,
anniversaries, etc.

1

a mix of address numbers

1

A number sequence. Thats the only way I can remember it. I have to remember about twenty
password between my job and home use.

1

a number used for something else

1

A numeric version of a madeup word that amuses me.

1

a pattern

1

a portion of a family member's SSN

1

a series of favorite numbers

1

a series of repeating numbers

1

A set of numbers that have no meaning no very familiar to me.

1

A special date and time of a personal event

1

A variation on my wife's birthday.

1

Acronym from telephone dial buttons

1

Added additional numbers to a date familiar to me.

1

ADDRESS

1

Ages and initials of family members

1

Alsop Test

1

An old address from my home of record.

1

An old military ID #

1

an old phone number

1

An old phone number that no one else would know.

1

An old phone number, pre-service.
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1

An order of preference for a sequential series of familiar numbers. i.e. Say for example Fruits:
Apple, Nectarine, Orange, Pear. Alphabetically they are A, N, O, P. But I like (for example)
Nectarines first, then Pear, then Apple, then Orange. So if A, N, O, P correspond to 1,2,3,4 then my
preference is 2,4,1,3 which would be a PIN 2413. Kinda complex but it works for me.

1

anniversaries

1

Base the PIN off familiar number sequences significant in my life.

1

Based on a personal experience

1

Birth dates

1

birth year month, date

1

birthdate

1

birthdate of child

1

birthdates

1

Birthday

1

birthday

1

Birthday of an historical figure.

1

birthday, using #'s for day, month, year, of sibling

1

brith dates of members

1

Can't say without giving it away.

1

certain digits from mine and spouses SSNs

1

child's dob

1

Codes (letters to numbers)

1

combination names and ages

1

Combination of a few previous street addresses

1

combination of familiar numbers

1

combination of famillar dates in a certain sequence

1

Combination of family member's birthdays

1

Combination of numbers using an old zip code as part of the pin

1

Combination of personal numbers

1

Convert one of may childrens names to digits using a telephone key pad.

1

date

1

date

1

date

1

date

1

date

1

date

1

date

1

Date

1

Date Combination

1

Date of an event

1

date of birth of a special family member, not my own

1

dates

1

Dates

1

Dates I remember or even sometimes a random number that I have already memorized

1

Daughter Birthdays

1

daughters dob
Depending on the work location, used something directly related to the work area to remind me of
the pin.

1
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1

Digits are added, or subtracted, at multiple place holding positions in a familiar and easily
remembered number sequence.

1

Dog's birthdate.

1

Don't feel comfortable answering this question.

1

don't understand the question

1

Drivers license number

1
1

Easy date to remember
exact same basic PIN and change the special character(s) at front, moving left to right on the
qwerty keyboard.

1

familiar date

1

familiar date

1

familiar date

1

Familiar date

1

familiar date

1

familiar date

1

familiar date

1

familiar date

1

familiar date

1

familiar date

1

familiar date (scrambled)

1

Familiar date, in an uncommon order (not the usual YYYY/MM/DD format) Also combinations of
Licence plates, VINs and telephone #'s and AFSC's

1

familiar date/pattern

1

Familiar number

1

Familiar number sequence

1

Familliar date

1

Family member birth date

1

family member's birthday

1

FAMILY MEMBERS PHONE #

1

For my pin I use something that has meaning to me.

1
1

For this PIN I selected the numeric day each of my three family members were born.
For us "Old farts," a perfect pin was no problem. We once had service numbers before we went to
the SSAN!

1

former street addresses

1

High school mascot and jersey numbers from football and basketball; first and only pin I have ever
used with all my accounts requiring a PIN

1

I associate an application with an old number that I used to use frequently enough that I can still
recall it without much extra effort

1

I currently use a combination of old addresses. Previously, I used a friends old telephone number.

1

I end up with whatever I can get the system to take.

1

I have a password / pin formula (different for each) that is known only to me. I pick a "seed" word or
number sequence that is familiar to me (e.g., old license number, scout troop number) and
transform it through the formula. The result is a password / pin that meets requirements.
Occasionally, I will change the formula. Neither formula nor "seed" is ever written down.

1

I have a system.

1

I have an interest in history, I currently use the dates and places of events from the 14th and 15th
century to derive my PINs.

1

i just know it

1

I just remember where i met my wife, how many kids i have and my grandmother's birthday.
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1
1

I listed all of the house numbers I have ever lived at in my entire life, in a certain order.
I randomly pick area codes that i know and put them together in a particular sequence that only I
know

1

I remember phone numbers more from the pattern they make on the keypad, rather than the actual
numbers, so I used the same thought and picked a pattern on the number pad.

1

I use a combination of an old phone number and street address.

1

I use a combination of frequently used other pins.

1
1

I use a combination of numbers that easily come to mind due to a hobby I have.
I use a fairly distant relative's birthday for my CAC PIN. Use other sequences for personal
accounts.

1

I use a number I had on my high school ID

1

I use a pin number that I frequently use in everyday life so that its easy to remember.

1

I use a street address I haven't lived at for 10 years; then, add unrelated numbers.

1

I use family birthdate combinations.

1

I use family members' dates of birth, like father, sister, etc.

1
1

I use my cell phone # all mixed around.
I use phone numbers that are familiar to me but not directly associated with me (e.g., friends' phone
numbers).

1

I use the date of when my husband and i met.

1

I use the sail number of my recreational sailboat

1

I used the cell phone number of another person that I would not forget.

1

I used the Gregory-Newton Formula of Interpolation to compute a value--of some personal
significance--from a common logarithm of exponential and hyperbolic functions and substituted a
number for the decimal in the log cos 10

1

I would rather not say.

1

If I told you, you'd know my pin!

1

I'm not telling you.

1

important dates

1

important dates

1

Info from my other personality.

1

initials+year

1

It is a significant date to me.

1

just a social i know

1

Keyboard pattern

1

keyboard pattern

1

Keyboard pattern

1

keyboard pattern in a shape that I can recall.

1
1

keypad on the right of the keyboard and put it in like i'm dialing a phone number.
Last 2 digits of my birth year plus the 4 digits of a year mentioned in a particular favorite song of
mine.

1

last 4 from my childhood phone number

1

last 6 SSN

1

Last to First Familiar

1

Math Functions

1

Memory

1

1

multiple, sometimes patterned sequence to correlate tele pad words (like texting)
My birth year, my husband's birth year, year of our wedding are used as the basis of the CAC PIN.
However, the numbers are adjusted so that they are not employed in a way that is obvious and
easily detected.

1

My college dorm address plus the room number

1

My old street address number.
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1

No Comment

1

NONE

1

None of your business or one of the above from number 8

1

NUMBEERS BACKWARDS

1

Number not associated with me, but one that I'm unlikely to forget.

1

numbers

1

numbers from a phone number that a family member once had for 50 years

1

Numbers from SSan

1

Numbers I can remember

1

Numbers in a pattern (related to my anniversary date)...

1

numbers of birthdays in my family

1

numbers of previous units

1

Numerical sequence

1

Numerical Sequence

1

obsolete addresses, phone numbers, etc.

1

Old family secret

1

Old High School Football Number to start and finish PIN

1

OLD PHONE

1

Old phone number, no longer in use.

1

OLD STREET ADDRESS

1

Old telephone number

1

old telephone number

1

Old telephone number and year

1

One that I can easily remember. I have 21 diferent pins for AF use; that is ridiculious.

1

Parents phone number

1

Part alteration of my birth date and part keyboard pattern.

1

Part of an obscure phone number.

1

Parts of old telephone numbers

1

past event in my life

1

Past squadrons I have been assigned to.

1

pattern

1

Pattern

1

pattern

1

pattern on keypad

1

Pattern on numbered key pad.

1
1

PERSONAL NUMBER
Personal references condensed into either some form of abbreviations, or acronyms that are easily
remembered.

1

ph #

1

PHONE

1

Phone

1

PHONE

1

phone #

1

phone #

1

Phone # from old assignment

1

PHONE FRIEND

1

phone number

1

phone number
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1

phone number

1

phone number

1

phone number

1

Phone number for loved one.

1

portion of SSN

1

prefix of two different phone #'s

1

Random scrambled addresses

1

Ref question 8. I have a number that is meaningful to me but does NOT contain date, age, SSN...
My "method" is a compilation of unrelated information but again, I've been able to personalize.

1

relative birthdays

1

religious significance

1

Repeat home address twice

1

repeat numbers

1

repetetive motion

1

same 4 number punched in two times

1

Sequence

1

Sequence

1

Sequence of special events.

1

Sequence/pattern of numbers that I am familier with.

1

Sequence/repeating numbers

1

significant date

1

significant date

1

SIGNIFICANT NUMBER AND DATE

1

Significant year groupings from events in my life that would not be obvious to someone who does
know my methodology

1

Significant years, but not a single date

1

similarity with other pin

1

Since CAC pin is 8 digits I use a combination of to other 4 digit pins that I use frequently.

1

slip my age in there and my initials

1

something familiar to both my husband and myself; not SSN, phone, or DOB

1

something I can remember.

1

something that is an important date in my life.

1

Something unique in everyday use to remember the pin...due the other numerous passwords we
ain the Air Force have to have for CBT sites & everything else!

1

Spatial Pattern

1

Sports dates of significance

1

SSN

1

SSN

1

ssn, atm pin numbers, debit card numbers

1

street address

1

Street Address

1

Symmetry, repetition

1

take a date familiar to me and re-arrange the alpha-numerical order

1

TELE

1

telephone

1

TELEPHONE #

1

telephone number

1

telephone number
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1

Telephone number

1

telephone number

1

telephone number

1

Telephone number from when I was a young child growing up.

1

Telephone number of someone from the phonebook

1

Telephone number pad based pattern.

1

the birthdate of a family member

1

the combination of the first bicycle lock I ever owned

1

the day of the month of the birth of myself, my spouse, and one of my daughters

1

The numerical date of my wife's birthday.

1

The year I graduated from College, the squadron I was in, and my last 4

1

unused phone numbers or addresses

1

Use a GPS coordinate technique

1

Use familiar numbers.

1

used number combinations familiar to me but not easily traceable to me.

1

variation of SSN

1

Variety of SSN numbers.

1

Very old telephone number

1

wedding anniversary date, child birthday etc.

1

wedding date

1

With the requirement here to have multiple passwords for nirpnet, siprnet, JWICS and CAC cards you need to develop a system to remember the sequence. Most folks just change the last letter - or
right it down somewhere to remember the number.

1

With trying to remember so many different PINs, I try to keep them simple so I wont forget.

1

year of birthdays of family members

1

Years of birth of certain people.

1

Zip Code + repeat last digit

2

?

2

8 character pattern +2 digits, characters or special characters

2

A combination of dates that marked significant events during my military career

2

a combination of familiar numbers from different sources

2

A common number to me entered twice.

2

A date that is meaningful to me but is unknown to others; in no records or files

2

A mix of family bithdates.

2

A number from way back in my past

2

a number i will remember

2

a number relating to a memorable date

2

A numercial sequence that is significant to me so it will be easy to remember.

2

A pattern that I move around the keyboard each time I must change my PIN.

2

A random combination of numbers

2

A series of numbers easy for me to remember

2

A series of numbers that form a pattern.

2

a series of numbers that i remember

2

A series of numbers that I remember, not related to SSN, b-day or any identifying information

2

a significant date

2

a significant number that relates to a familiar event in my life

2

a special sequence of my favorite 2-digit number
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2

A variety of numbers

2

Acromym converted to digital sequence

2

Add a number to the front and back of an existing PIN.

2

an account number

2

An easily rememberde series
an old telephone number (4 numbers) from an assignment many years ago and a couple more
random digits

2
2

an random bunch of numbers I memorized.

2
2

Another memorable number
Any combination of numbers which I'll remember but not address, phone number or SSN..those are
to easy to break

2

association - number "couples" mean something to me personally; a part of a specific date that is
sentimental in nature

2

Association of time/dates of my own personal experience.

2

Based on familiar (to me) information from my past.

2

b-day

2

birth years of persons I know

2

Birthday of relative.

2

Boy Scout troop

2

change last two numbers, if we weren't required to change every 60 days,then we would have to
write them down. I could understand if it was compromised. When you have several different
accounts with different pins, how in the crap do you remember them without writing them down.

2

Childhood friends/pets

2

classified!

2

Close my eyes and pick numbers or letters on my keyboard and if it is aceptable I memorize it.

2

combination of birth dates of 2 of my 4 children.

2

combination of college student id number

2

combination of dates

2

Combination of easy numbers for me which add up to nothing

2

combination of important dates

2

Combination of old zip codes, phone numbers, and a personal number that I use. Again, all very old
- just nmbers that come back to me easily.

2

Combination of previously assigned unit designations.

2

2

Combination of significant personal numbers.
Combination of things that will be easy for me to remember, yet comply with 9 alphanumeric/character requirement.
Combination of two numbers that I know well that together equal the minimum number of
characters

2

combinations of unrelated birth months and years from different family members

2

2

Combine number patterns that have meaning for me but are NOT related to any personal info such
as SSN, address, phone etc
Combined numbers of squadrons that I've known since high school. Some are real world, others
are fictional.

2

Committed to memory

2

Concatenation of some remembered prime(s and yy or 100-yy or yyyy or 10000-yyyy for some
memorable year(s)} in a remembered permutation of these items.

2

Convert an important word to me + numbers into a pin

2

2

created group of familiar numbers

2

dates

2

Devise an eight to nine word sentence and use the first letter of each word. Always use one word
that represents each a number and special character to fullfill that requirement.
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2

digits of interest

2

Do not write down CAC pin On other passwords save on travel drive. I have over 125 passwords

2
2

dont know
Don't recall using a technique or where I got the number...was something easy for me to
remember.

2

easy

2

easy number to remember

2

Easy to remember

2

Easy to remember number combinations from my life.

2

Event dates and times

2

EXAMPLE: #1438JpQUI

2

Familiar number

2

familiar number with variation

2

familiar/favorite # sequence....ie size of car engine from teenage years

2

Famous sports figures.

2

Favorite words in a song.

2

First wife's day and year of birth (no month) combined with the last 4 of her SSAN. Comment on
question 10: They are a necessary nuisance.

2

Former unit's numerical designations

2

friends b-day

2

ghtdr

2

have my own

2

I am using a passpharse method.

2

I CAN NOT TELL YOU

2

I can't remember numbers only finger positions on a key pad. It is a physical technique.

2

I chose numbers that have a specific meaning to me in relationship to sports.

2

I currently use a very important date in my life. It's something I will never forget therefore, I don't
ever have to write it down.

2

I derive a number from familiar numbers, being careful to not make an obvious pattern. The same
goes for more complex PINs to include upper and lower case keys.

2

I do not have a "technique" other than building one that is not obvious.

2

I don't have a technique...

2

I don't remember how I came up with the number, to be honest.

2

I duplicated a familiar 4 digit number used when I was in high school.

2

I easily remeber numbers and use the last 4 digits of the telephone numbers from 2 two of my
friends from middle school.

2

I have a portion of a very old phone number that I use only for my CAC pin.

2

I have a sequence that I can identify with easily

2

I have numbers that hold significance but are not related to dates

2

I just remember some Numbers.

2

I just used a random technique, based on keyboard layout to facilitate ease of typing in the PIN

2

I occassionaly spell out a word on a phone and use the corresponding numbers.

2

i picked random numbers out of a hat until i had a pin

2

I rather keep this to myself

2

I relate the numbers to the musical tones on the phone and I link the "tone" PIN to songs I like

2

I strongly believe you should not ask this ?

2

I tend to use a combination of significant dates.

2

I think of it as a internal clock.
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2

I think of things I would only know that I experienced and was too ashamed to let anyone know.

2

I use #'s that are easy for me to remember.

2

I use 2 meaningful dates, no birthdays, anniversaries, etc.

2

I use a combination of two different numbers that are familiar to me.

2

I use a favorite number, a favorite date along with random numbers and letters as required by
whatever program requires

2

I use a strong password and convert it to the PIN using the telephone pad letter to numbers format.

2

I use a technique of the current event happen in my life right now.

2

I use all the number down the middle of the keypad.

2

I use an anniversary date.

2

I use an old phone extension from my house that I grew up in. It is no longer associated with my
family. I repeat the 4 numbers twice.

2

I use my favorite numbers that have no relation to telephone, street or birthdate.

2

I use something important to me, makes it easier to remember.

2

i use the current rules but in a combination that is meaningful to me

2

I use the last 6 digits of a very old overseas telephone number.

2

I use the one potato... two potato method...

2

I use the same PIN which I use for banking.

2

I used a random set of numbers and commited them to memory. I have to use this pin many times
per day so its was not hard to commit it to memeory.

2

IAW Air Force instructions

2

important date

2

Important dates (not birthday, anniversary, etc) something obscure to me only

2

Important family dates.

2

Important occurance in personal life

2

important personal date

2

initals converted to numbers twice

2

Initials of family members and the year I graduated. Just things that are easy to remember

2

Is this a trick question? Please.......

2

It was an id number that I had from an airline job, that met all the requirements of a pin.

2

It'a variation of different dates.

2

It's a serial number for a machine

2

It's just a number I came up with about 10 years ago and now consider it to be "my number."

2

Jusr remember it.

2

Just a set of numbers that I have memorized as long as I use it on a regular basis

2

Just memory

2

just picked numbers.

2

Just simple, easy to remember pattern. But not easy enough for anyone to figure out, I hope.

2

keyboard sequence

2

last 4 of ex-husbands SSN plus mmyy of ex-anniversary

2

last four of my childhood phone number plus my lucky number.

2

Letter/number patterns from keyboard.

2

letters that I can convert to numbers in a logical manner

2

Linked to something only I'd know.

2

locker combination from highschool

2

Made up numbers, no sequence

2

Made up PIN.

2

Make up a phrase and use the first letter of the phrase.
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2

Mathematical formula to generate the digits.

2

memoriable numbe

2

Memorization

2

memorization

2

memorization

2

Memorization.

2

Memorization.

2

memorization.

2

Memorize

2

Memorize it.

2

memory

2

Memory

2

memory

2

Memory

2

Memory

2

Memory of the past

2

Memory....if I don't hvae to change this every time I wake up, remembering it is easy

2

Military arms designations

2

mind over matter

2

Mix of important numbers

2

My favorite band's album title.

2

My line numbers for promtion to SMSgt and CMSgt.

2

My own.

2

My pin is related to a fond memory. So old no one would ever figure it out.

2

n/a

2

N/A

2

NAMES OF OLD PETS, SPORTS TEAMS, CARTOON CHARACTERS

2

No technique

2

no technique

2

no technique - thought of one and remember it....

2

No technique utilized.

2

No technique. I just memorized it.

2

No technique. I just used random numbers and memorized them.

2

Non sequential set of numbers and letters.

2

none

2

None

2

none

2

none

2

none

2

none - random

2

None of your business

2

None of your business.

2

None specific just make one up

2

None YA BUSINESS

2

none.

2

None...originated from Bank's pin numbering techniques. Something else to consider, my technique
in the past has depended on the number pad being used. I've used a designs and patterns.
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2

nonsence word

2

Not to tell anyone

2

Nothing special, other than using the same PIN for a long period of time, so I can do it in my sleep.

2

number associated with phone number letters

2

Number familarization

2

number pad strokes

2

Number pattern, but not sequential.

2

numbers and letters

2

numbers from jersey I wore in sports

2

Numbers similar to another password

2

Numbers that are siginificant to my family

2

Numbers that flow together easily in my mind and not consecutive numbers (e.g. 1,2,3,4)

2

numbers that I will remember

2

Numbers that mean something to me and would only be known by me.

2

Numbers which popped into my head.

2

obscure birthdays

2

Old ID # from high school

2

Old number that means something to me, but not to anyone else. i.e. not documented

2

Old PIN from a bank account closed 18 years ago.

2

old security code

2

one that is easy for me to remenmber

2

Part SSAN Part phone mixed up

2

pattern

2

pattern sequence of numbers on keypad

2

Personal only known to me

2

phone key alpha translation; pick a word association

2

pick whatever pops into my head at the time and hope I remember it.

2

Picked numbers that had personal meaning to me, followed by a year that had meaning also.

2

Picked the last four digits of an old work telephone number and added to other digits in front of it.

2

ramdom number, letters and special charactors

2

random

2

random

2

random

2

random

2

random

2

random

2

Random

2

Random

2

Random #s

2

random 7 numbers

2

Random character generator

2

random characters

2

random number

2

random number

2

random numbers

2

random numbers

2

random numbers
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2

Random numbers

2

random numbers

2

Random numbers

2

Random numbers

2

Random numbers on a telephone keypad.

2

Random numbers selection

2

Random numbers.

2

random numbers...

2

random pick of numbers and letters

2

Random sequence

2

Random sequence of characters.

2

random sequence of numbers and alpha characters that are extracted from my immediate faimily
members names, dates of birth and cell phone numbers.

2

random words and numbers

2

Random, progressive combination

2

randomly chose 7 numbers

2

randomly generated lotto numbers

2

Rember the PIN number

2

Right now it is part of my old phone number growing up, a long long time ago

2

scrabble tiles with reverse precedence starting at the letter Q. Random draw.

2

scrambled memorized numbers

2

sequence numbers

2

Sequence on the keypad I can remember.

2

Series of #'s and letters upper & lower case mixed around.

2

Set of common numbers I can easily remember. Lab #, notebook #, ect

2

several rows of the keyboard and use upper or lower case

2

Significant numbers to me

2

some numbers correspond to letters that are part of a word that means something to me and the
remaining numbers are numbers that mean something to me

2

some thing from my past

2

Something easily remembered.

2

Something easy to remember

2

Something easy to remember

2

something for me to remember

2

something I easily remember and no one else can guess

2

something that I can remember easily

2

spell a word

2

Strictly thought out process.

2

That's personal

2

2

The calendar date I was drafted.
The name of a former pet converted to numbers via telephone number buttons. I set my own PIN
the day I received my first CAC card and have used this same PIN only for my CAC since that time
(2002).

2

Thing that are for me eazy to remember

2

This is not a question that should be asked. If I answer correctly you can obtain my PIN.

2

two credit card pin numbers pushed together

2

up and down

2

Use the same one for everything I can
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2

Used a variation of a current pin that I've used for 20 years.

2

Utilize a number that has significance to me only.

2

Various

2

very old telephone number (last 4)

2

We have so many (red that as WAY TOO MANY) pins and passwords that I believe anyone who
says they don't wite them down is less than honest.

2

Whatever comes to mind at the time I am selecting a new PIN

2

whatever is easiest for me to remember and meets system requirement
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